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This study examines several issues related to mutual fund herd behavior. First, a
unifying and consistent framework for measuring herd behavior is developed. This frame-
work generates portfolio-level measures for each fund manager over each quarter, and relates
herd behavior to other aspects of portfolio dynamics. Simulations indicate significant and
persistent non-random herd behavior. Second, mechanisms that potentially underly herd
behavior are tested. Empirical results indicate that herding funds tend to i) change their
holdings towards levels similar to peers, ii) have less experienced managers, and iii) under-
perform their peers. These results are consistent with a career concerns theory of herding.
Third, the impact of mutual fund herding on stock liquidity is examined. Empirical results
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Herd behavior in a capital market setting is described by a group of investors moving
money into or out of the same securities at the same time. Evidence over the past 40 years
indicates that institutional investors may exhibit herd-like behavior.1 More recently, research
on investor herding has focused on a specific set of institutional investors, mutual fund
managers. There is significant interest in understanding herd behavior among this group
of professional investors for several reasons. First, the size of the mutual fund industry
($5.961 trillion in assets under management as of February 2011) suggests that common
investment decisions among these managers may have considerable effects on asset prices
and liquidity2. Second, the delegated nature of portfolio management in the mutual fund
industry introduces several interesting theoretical explanations for their herd behavior. For
example, do managers herd because it is in their own interest, or is it in the interest of
shareholders? Third, mutual fund managers report their holdings quarterly. These publicly
available data offer the econometrician an opportunity to measure and learn about herd
behavior among fund managers both in the cross section and through time. The chapters
that follow focus on these issues. Chapter 2 introduces a new framework to measure herding,
1See, for example, Kraus and Stoll (1972) for early evidence on herding among institutional investors.
2The size of the equity mutual fund industry as reported by Investment Company Institute, Trends in
Mutual Fund Investing, March 30, 2011
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Chapter 3 applies this framework in order to examine why fund managers herd, and Chapter
4 studies the impact that mutual fund herding may affect stock liquidity.
In Chapter 2 a framework for measuring investor herd behavior is proposed. Specifi-
cally, each portfolio is modeled as a physical entity moving through n-1 dimensional stock-
space. The portfolio weights at the beginning of each quarter determine the fund’s ‘location’,
and as these weights change over time the fund moves through space. For each fund, the
direction it is moving relative to its peers is measured over each quarter. This results in a
fund, or portfolio-level, measure of herding over each quarter. In this way funds that trade
in the same direction (herding funds) can be distinguished from funds whose trades resemble
noise, and from those whose trades are contrarian.
The primary benefit of this framework is that additional metrics of portfolio evolution
can be measured in a consistent manner, thus preserving any mechanical relationships. For
example, it may be useful to examine how herd behavior relates to the similarity in portfolio
holdings. Therefore the distance in stock-space between each fund and its peers is measured
every quarter. This represents the similarity in the level of holdings. By using Euclidean
geometry to measure not just the direction or distance, but any aspect of common portfolio
evolution, all mechanical relationships between these metrics are preserved. In this way, the
framework developed in this chapter provides a consistent and unifying method for measuring
many aspects of portfolio dynamics.
This framework is used in Chapter 3 to test theories of investor herding. Fund man-
agers may exhibit correlated trading because they are gathering information about stocks’
future payoffs. If a group of managers has information for an overlapping set of securities,
then they will tend to buy the same undervalued stocks, and sell the same overvalued stocks.
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This is the informed trading explanation of herd behavior. On the other hand, managers
might herd, not because they are creating value for shareholders by trading on information,
but instead because it is personally costly for the manager to hold a portfolio that is too
different from her peers. The idea that there may be ‘safety in numbers’ among mutual fund
managers is the career concerns theory of herding. In other words, a manager who makes
bad portfolio decisions is less likely to be fired if her peers also made bad decisions. However,
if her decisions turn out to be wrong and she is alone in her actions, she will be deemed to
be a poor quality manager and be fired. This can induce managers to focus less on creating
value for shareholders, and more on herding in order to protect their personal careers.
In order to test these hypotheses, the direction a fund is trading relative to peers is
computed in each quarter and for each fund. This direction is compared with the distance
between funds in order to examine if funds are trading together in an effort to maintain
similar portfolios as suggested by career concerns. Then an examination of the fund and
manager characteristics that are associated with the direction measure is conducted.
Empirical evidence supports the career concerns hypothesis of herding. Fund man-
agers that exhibit herd behavior tend to be trading towards the portfolio weights of their
peers. These herding managers tend to be inexperienced relative to the managers whose
trades are more independent. Finally, the subsequent performance of herding funds is low.
These results are consistent with career concerns and difficult to reconcile with herding as
the outcome of informed trading.
In Chapter 4, an examination of the impact of mutual fund herding on stock liquid-
ity is conducted. Previous research documents a significant correlation in liquidity across
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stocks3. There are several possible reasons that stocks’ liquidity might positively covary.
There may be correlation across stocks in the adverse selection problem that generates a
the liquidity premium. Or, there may be correlation in the costs of supplying liquidity from
the perspective of the market maker (e.g. inventory costs). Chapter 5 tests an alternate
hypothesis, that correlation in liquidity results from correlation in the demand for liquidity.
That is, if there is a large group of investors that tend to own similar stocks, trade at similar
times, and in similar directions, then these stocks are likely to experience liquidity shocks
at similar points in time. Thus, stocks that are subject to correlated trading among mutual
funds are likely to be those same stocks with correlated liquidity.
Evidence indicates that the liquidity of stocks which are heavily owned by mutual
funds covary together. This effect is stronger when funds trade more, i.e. when ownership
is weighted by fund turnover. The effect is also stronger during periods of high flows into
or out of the mutual fund industry. These results support the hypothesis that correlated
trading among mutual funds contributes to the observed common liquidity across stocks.
3See, for example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman
and Halka (2001), Eckbo and Norli (2002), Brockman, Chung and Perignon (2007), and Karolyi, Lee and
vanDijk (2008) regarding commonality in liquidity
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Chapter 2
A Framework for Measuring Herd Behavior
In this chapter I create a novel framework for measuring multiple aspects of herd
behavior in a consistent and unifying way. The framework generates manager-level measures
of common portfolio evolution. Each manager’s portfolio is given a location in stock-space
according to the portfolio weights. As the manager trades, the portfolio weights change and
so does the location of the portfolio. For each manager and quarter I measure the direction
the fund is moving in stock-space relative to its peers. This captures the similarity in both the
sign and magnitude of the manager’s trades with those of other funds. Secondly I measure
the distance between a manager’s portfolio from peers. This captures the similarity in the
portfolio holdings at any given point in time. I describe the cross-sectional distribution
of these measures and their persistence through time. Last, I compare managers’ actual
holdings and trades to a simulated system of portfolios evolving over time under the null
hypothesis that trades are independent across managers.
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review
Investor herding is loosely defined as a group of investors trading in the same stocks
at the same time in the same direction. Over the past four decades, researchers have offered
several ways to measure investor herd behavior. The goal of this chapter is to introduce a
5
new econometric approach to measuring investor herding. The framework developed within
contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, I measure behavior at the fund-
level, not stock-level as in previous literature. Second, the framework I employ allows for
multiple aspects of portfolio evolution to be measured under the same methodology, thus
preserving any mathematical relationships between metrics. This is useful if the researcher
would like to examine any non-random relationships between herding and other portfolio
dynamics. Third, other previously used portfolio metrics can be put into this framework,
which pinpoints exactly how these seemingly unrelated measures used in previous literature
are mathematically connected.
Kraus and Stoll (1972) is among the earliest empirical work on the topic. The authors
use data on the trades of 229 institutional investors and construct the trade imbalance for
each stock stock across all investors.1 This is a simple way to capture the extent with which
a group of investors are trading together. Several papers have used variants of the trade
imbalance concept, such as changes in ownership, signed imbalances, or signed percentage
imbalances.2
An important refinement is offered by Lakonishok et al. (1992). The authors define
a measure of correlated trading that explicitly adjusts for the amount of correlated trading
that would be expected under a null hypothesis of independent trades across investors. They
calculate the fraction of funds trading in the same direction within a stock and quarter, and
compare this across stocks (the LSV measure). Specifically, the LSV measure is defines as
1In a given stock-month the dollar net imbalance (DNI) is defined as DNI = |TP −TS| where TP is the
total dollars purchased by the 229 investors in that given stock-month, and TS is the total dollars sold.
2For example, see Wermers (1999), Sias (2004), Sias and Choi (2009), Pomorski (2009).
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LSV = |pi,t − p̄t| −E|pi,t − p̄t|, where pi,t is the proportion of funds that are trading in stock
i that are buyers of stock i in time t. The expectation term is calculated assuming pi,t is
binomially distributed and the probability that a fund is a buyer is independent of other
funds.
These measures of herding developed in previous literature have one general element
in common; behavior is summarized at the stock-level. A stock-level measure of herding is
the natural econometric approach if the researcher hopes to learn about effects of herding on
prices, liquidity, or other variables that exist at the stock dimension. However, this approach
to summarizing herding may not be best suited to address other related topics.
One such topic is the examination of the motivation(s) that may underly herding.
Several papers have addressed this topic, and in doing so recognize that a fund, or manager-
level measure of herding is best. The first of these papers, Grinblatt et al. (1995), generated
a fund-level measure of herding by aggregating the LSV stock-level measure for each fund.
The fund level measure, FHM, developed in Grinblatt et al (1995) is used to show that funds
which tend to trade with the herd also trade on momentum.
Other papers have also used the FHM measure [e.g. Dass et al. (2008), Massa and
Patgiri (2010)]. My paper contributes to these primarily by developing a framework for
summarizing herd behavior at the fund-level in both trades and holdings, and showing how
these behaviors are inter-related.3
Using mutual fund holdings from 1990-2006, I measure the direction a fund is changing
3I discuss in detail later how measuring behavior at the stock-level and then aggregating within each
fund (such as FHM) can give quite different results from summarizing behavior at the fund-level (such as
the measure developed later in this chapter).
7
its portfolio relative to its peers. This is the fund-level measure of herding. Additionally,
I measure the similarity in the holdings of a fund and its peers which for reasons that will
be clear later, is called distance. Numerous other metrics of portfolios can be summarized
in the same framework, however these are the two upon which I focus. The measure of
herding, direction, summarizes common portfolio dynamics for each fund, and as discussed
it is most closely related to FHM developed by Grinblatt et al. (1995). The static measure
of common portfolios, distance, is closely related to several previous measures of common
portfolio holdings.
There are several papers that generate fund-level measures of the similarity in hold-
ings. Two of these papers relate similarity to performance. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zhang
(2005) show that funds with industry weights similar to the market underperform those with
dissimilar industry weights. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) measure the similarity in stock
weights relative to an inferred benchmark and find that funds with weights similar to the
benchmark underperform those with dissimilar stock weights. A third paper specifically re-
lates similarity in holdings with career concerns. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) measure the
similarity in industry holdings relative to an aggregate peer portfolio. They find that fund
managers with holdings similar to peers tend to be inexperienced, younger managers who are
fired more quickly conditional on performance. Taken together, the results in these papers
are similar to the relationships I find between the similarity in holdings and performance
or tenure. The primary contribution of my paper relative to these is that I connect the
similarity in holdings with the literature on similar trading.
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2.2 Methodology
I summarize fund managers’ investment behavior in two ways. Over each quarter
I measure the tendency with which a given fund trades in the same direction as other
peer funds. This is the fund-level analog to the traditional LSV stock-level measure of
herding. The second fund-level measure of herd behavior is motivated by the career concerns
mechanism. In addition to the tendency to trade together, I also measure the similarity in
holdings between funds.
In order to measure these aspects of fund behavior in a consistent manner, I rely
on a framework of physical herds such as those of birds or sheep. A herd of sheep might
naturally be modeled by first indicating each entity’s location on two-dimensional earth’s
surface. Then from each would be a vector pointing in the direction it is traveling, with
length indicating its speed. One might examine the herding nature of a group by measuring
the variance of the directions that the entities are moving. Or, one might examine the
herding nature of a particular entity by asking if it is moving in the same direction as its
peers. That is, if the angle between its vector and others’ vectors is small, then it is herding.
Other characteristics in addition to the direction may be important to consider, and of
course this will depend on context. For example, I will argue later that an entity’s proximity
to the herd may also be useful to distinguish the underlying mechanism(s) of herding. Is a
fund located in the middle of the pack, or on the outskirts?
Each portfolio can be thought of as a physical entity whose location evolves over
time. Portfolios are modeled as evolving through n-1 dimensions of stock space. A fund’s
location in stock space is determined by its portfolio weights. As the fund manager trades,
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the weights change and so the location of the portfolio evolves from one quarter to the next.
The nature of the evolution of these portfolios through stock space can be summarized in a
number of ways. I characterize two aspects that reflect herd behavior; the direction a fund
is moving relative to its peers and the distance it is from its peers.
The direction a portfolio is moving relative to peers summarizes for each fund and
quarter the degree with which the fund is trading with the herd. In the figure below, the
direction the fund is moving is indicated by the angle θ between the fund and herd. In this
3-security example, both the fund and herd are increasing their portfolio weights in stock A
and B, and by default decreasing their portfolio weighs in the remaining security (I discuss
in the next section how I deal with this redundant dimension). In this particular example
the fund is tilting its portfolio more strongly towards B than is the herd, and so they are
not changing their portfolios in exactly the same direction. If the fund were buying and
selling the same stocks that the herd was buying and selling, and in the same proportion,
then θ would equal zero and the fund would be perfectly herding in portfolio weight changes.
Conceptually, this is the measure of herd behavior closest to the stock level measure and is
of primary interest.
10
The distance in stock space between a fund’s portfolio and that of the herd reflects
the similarity in portfolio weight levels. In the extreme, a fund that owns exactly the herd
portfolio will be located in exactly the same place in stock space, and therefore have zero
distance to the herd. As the fund’s weights increasingly differ from the herd so will its
distance in stock space. In the example above, the fund’s portfolio is diverging, or becoming
less similar to that of the herd. This highlights a case in which despite trading in a similar
direction as the herd, the holdings become less similar over the quarter.
All aspects of portfolio evolution are measured with Euclidean geometry. This not
only provides consistency across measures, but also relates closely to econometric counter-
parts. As I discuss later, the cosine of the angle between vectors is an un-centered, or
non-Pearson correlation. The distance between a fund and the herd is the root sum of
squared errors between their portfolio weights. These statistical measures are perhaps less
intuitive in a physical sense but more commonly used in financial economics.
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2.3 Results
I obtain quarterly mutual fund holdings data from Thompson for 1990 through 2006.
I match holdings with stock and mutual fund data from CRSP using MFLinks. I retain
all funds that are not identified as index funds per the index fund flag variable from CRSP
and that have a benchmark as identified by Cremers and Petajisto (2009).4 Stock holdings
are adjusted for splits that occur between the record and file date. I exclude funds that
do not report holdings in March, June, September, or December. This reduces the sample
size as funds are not required to report holdings during these months, but has the benefit of
ensuring common timing of information releases (to as fine a granularity as possible given the
data). I require funds to report in consecutive quarters in order to estimate active portfolio
weight changes. This reduces the sample size further, as funds are not required to report
holdings quarterly throughout the entire time period. If a fund misses a report date it will
periodically drop out of the sample.5
It is important to note that portfolio evolution through stock space is restricted.
Portfolio weights must sum to 1 and so also their changes must sum to zero.6 This means
that one weight (or weight change) is a linear combination of the others. Therefore if
we include all portfolio weights or changes in weights as independent observations we will
overstate significance. To account for this, for each fund I drop the portion of its portfolio
4These data are provided by the authors at http://www.petajisto.net/data.html. These data are available
for the 1990-2006 period. Later I also show results that do not rely on the availability of these data.
5There are 58,068 fund-quarter observations that merge to CRSP using MFLinks and have activeshare.
Using only quarter-end report dates of March, June, September and December reduces the sample size to
46,328. Using only funds that report in consecutive quarters reduces the sample to 31,009.
6This is true for 92% of the fund-quarters in my sample - those whose value of holdings in Thompson
match the asset values in CRSP.
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in stocks with price less than five dollars.7 Because results in this paper are largely cross-
sectional, this adjustment should have little effect. But if we are to take the magnitudes of
the measures of similarity seriously, then it would not be fair to treat each portfolio weight
as a degree of freedom. So to be clear, I use all holdings to construct the weights and changes
in weights, but before computing any similarities I drop the portion of a fund’s portfolio in
stocks with price less than 5.
All aspects of portfolio evolution are made in reference to an aggregate peer portfolio
which I refer to as the herd or herd portfolio. I identify peer funds based on inferred
benchmark using the data provided by Cremers and Petajisto. The authors infer a fund’s
benchmark based on the portion of its portfolio that is similar to each benchmark. The
inferred benchmark is that to which the fund’s portfolio is most similar. I require at least
10 funds to be in any given peer group and quarter in order to estimate similarities.
The method by which peers are identified is likely important for inference. In the
next chapter, my goal is to distinguish evidence of agency problems from information, so a
natural grouping would be an ex ante identifier of funds that are likely to observe the same
signals or compete in the same job market. Using a holdings-based identifier such as the
distance to a benchmark therefore seems appropriate. If the goal is to examine herd behavior
relevant to asset prices, then it may make more sense to examine the mutual fund industry
as a whole (because any correlated trading within a peer group may be washed out by any
other peer group’s correlated trading, thus little expected impact on prices). Or, if the goal
7Results are not dependent this choice. In earlier drafts I have used the portion of each fund’s portfolio
that cannot be matched to CRSP, which is nonzero for only 8% of the sample, as the redundant dimension.
I choose the price=5 cutoff because the average total portfolio weight in these stocks is small and the gain
in data manageability is large.
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is to identify informed trades, one might try to use a finer grouping. This is exactly what
is done in Pomorski (2009). He groups funds by family as these managers are quite likely
to be trading on the same signals, and identifies informed trades as those that are common
within the peer group.
The majority of results in this chapter and Chapter 3 use peer groupings by inferred
benchmark. I include some robustness results using all funds industry-wide, and I have
replicated core results using funds’ objective code as reported by Thompson Reuters (un-
reported). Additional and likely informative groupings might be based on factor or cluster
analysis. Importantly, the framework developed here is not restrictive in this sense.
At the beginning of each quarter, each fund’s location in stock-space is defined by its
portfolio weights. The vector of portfolio weights for fund f at quarter t is denoted wf,t,





shares is the number of shares of stock i held by the fund as reported by Thompson and p
is the stock price. For each fund f = 1, 2, ..F , the average peer fund portfolio has portfolio






−f is the sum of all funds
excluding fund f .
2.3.1 Common Portfolio Statics: distance
The Euclidean distance is determined by the Pythagorean Theorem, which is equiv-
alent to root sum of squared errors between the two portfolios. This distance, which sum-
marizes the similarity in portfolio levels is:
distancef,t = ||wf,t − hf,t||
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Related measures are activeshare [Cremers and Petajisto (2009)], ICI [Kacperczyk,
Sialm and Zhang (2005)], and SectorDeviation [Chevalier and Ellison (1999)]. distance can
be thought of as the shortest, or bee-line distance between the fund and herd, whereas
activeshare is (one-half) the ‘city block’ distance to the benchmark. So activeshare differs
from distance in two ways, the reference point and the mathematical calculation distance.8
The ICI measure in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) reflects portfolio industry
concentration and is defined as the market-adjusted industry Herfindahl. A typical portfolio
Herfindahl is the squared distance to the origin. This is equivalent to the squared Euclidean
distance between the fund’s portfolio and the market portfolio (in industry space). Similarly,
the SectorDeviation measure in Chevalier and Ellison (1999) is also measured in industry
space, but these authors use the Euclidean distance between the fund and the herd. In this
way SectorDeviation is very similar to distance, the only difference being the dimensionality
of space.
In summary, the distance measure is the root sum of squared errors between the
portfolio weights of a given fund and the equal-weighted average weights of its peers. This is
measured at the beginning and end of each quarter. In this way, the data is used to generate
the similarity in the holdings of a fund relative to its peers in each cross section.
8The Euclidean distance that I use has the benefit of incorporating the nature of the differences, whereas
activeshare (by design) does not. Activeshare treats two portfolio weight difference of 5% the same as ten
portfolio weight differences of 1%. The Euclidean distance in the former case is
√
2 ∗ 0.052 = 0.07, but the
distance in the latter case is
√
10 ∗ 0.012 = 0.03. Treating the latter case as less different is ideal because
under this scenario the manager will have less tracking error. In this way the Euclidean distance incorporates
how diversified the differences are.
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2.3.2 Common Portfolio Dynamics: direction
In order to measure portfolio dynamics, I first adjust portfolio evolution for passive
and active movements. Changes in prices are constantly reshaping stock-space, and so
portfolios will move simply due to the passive realization of returns. While doing nothing
may be a valid strategy, including both passive and active weight changes runs the risk of
vastly overstating seemingly coordinated behavior. Therefore in each quarter I correct for
the effects of returns on portfolio weights. The vector of weight changes from t, to t + 1 is
denoted ∆wf,t where each element i is defined
∆wf,t,i = wf,t+1,i − wf,t,i ∗
rett,i
∑
i wf,t,i ∗ reti,t
,
and reti,t is the return of stock i from t to t + 1. For brevity I use w
′
f,t to denote the vector





So, each fund is modeled as a velocity vector ∆wf,t with location in stock space given
by wf,t. This vector is corrected for the movement of the portfolio that would occur from
passively realizing returns. Portfolio weights and changes are summarize in Table 2.1. I also
report the number of funds in the sample, the number of stocks held by the herd, and the
number of stocks held by a typical fund over a quarter.
To capture the similarity in portfolio weight changes, I measure the angle between the
fund and herd. If the angle is zero, the portfolio is moving in exactly the same direction as
the herd. The cosine function transforms the angle into a correlation, which is perhaps less
intuitive but a more commonly used statistic. This correlation is non-Pearson, or uncentered,
and is the metric I use to capture the similarity in portfolio changes:
16




The angle between fund and herd vectors (or the cosine of the angle) is more ap-
propriate than a typical correlation coefficient precisely because of the dropped redundant
portfolio weight. Changes in weights have a reference state of zero and this would not be
incorporated with a standard correlation coefficient. If all portfolio weights are used then
by definition the intercept would be zero, but this would be incorrect because we would be
treating each portfolio weight change as an independent observation when we know they
must sum to 0. In other words, if we could use all weights then the intercept will be by
definition zero, and a typical correlation coefficient would suffice. Because we need to drop
a dimension we must also force the inclusion of the intercept into the correlation coefficient.
This is exactly what is captured by the angle between the fund and herd vectors. The co-
sine of the angle between the two vectors is an uncentered correlation, which means that
it incorporates the effect of a fund moving into or out of the dropped dimension without
treating this movement as independent information. I summarize the computation of the
various measures of portfolio evolution in Table 2.2.
I begin by describing the distribution of these measures of herd behavior. Panel A
of Table 2.3 shows that the mean direction measure is 0.08 and median 0.051. The 10th
and 90th percentiles are -0.03 and 0.22 respectively. On average, the distance between a
fund and the herd is 0.13. The 10th and 90th percentiles are 0.08 and 0.18. For exposition
I summarize these variables calculated using only non-zero beginning or ending quarter
portfolio weights. Because a typical fund owns about 1/12th of the stocks owned by the
herd (Table I), 11/12ths of a fund’s weight changes will have zero correlation with peers.
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This table shows that conditional on positive ownership sometime over the quarter, the
average direction measure is about twice as high and the median is about 2.5 times as high.
Portfolios are also not surprisingly closer to the herd when ignoring zero positions. The
average distance in this case is 0.096. I show later that using this alternate definition does
not affect results.
Panel B plots the distributions of direction and distance. The figure shows that
direction has high positive skewness. There are a considerable number of funds with direction
close to zero (none with exactly zero values). These are funds whose holdings overlap very
little with those of their herd.9 The distribution of distance is closer to normal but also has
positive skewness. In the next section I examine the fund and manager characteristics that
describe these distributions.
Panel C of Table 2.3 shows the persistence of distance and direction. In each quarter
I rank funds into quintiles based on their measures of herding. I track these portfolios for
up to 8 quarters and report the top-minus-bottom quintile spread. For example, the value
of 0.067 in the bottom right cell indicates that funds put into quintiles based on direction 8
quarter in the past still exhibit a significant difference in their direction today. Therefore I
find significant persistence in herd and contrarian behavior.
I use a variety of fund characteristics as controls in later tests. For each fund and
quarter I collect from CRSP the fund’s expense ratio, turnover ratio, date of fund inception,
date that the current manager started at the fund, fund assets, and fund returns. I compute




9Core results are robust to the exclusion of funds with direction close to zero.
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at 1%. fund age is the time in years between the current quarter and fund inception. Similarly
mgr tenure is the time between the current quarter and the date the current manager started.
I exclude observations in which fund age is less than zero. If mgr tenure is larger than fund
age I set it equal to fund age. These adjustments are not critical to inference.10 These
variables are summarized in Table 2.4.
The average fund has $912 million in assets, expenses of 1.27%, and turnover ratio
of 0.84. I sort funds in each quarter on direction and report average characteristics. Funds
that strongly herd in trades (high direction) tend to be larger, although the relationship is
not monotonic. These funds have high turnover, low flows and low subsequent raw returns.
Funds that strongly herd in holdings (low distance) are also larger with low returns. There is
a strong monotonic relationship between direction and distance. Funds that trade with the
herd tend to have holdings very similar to the herd. This is the first evidence of a connection
between herding in holdings and herding in trades.
2.3.3 Simulated Portfolio Evolution
Although not the focus of this research, an important issue in the investor herding
literature is to compare herd behavior to that which we would expect due to chance. In
order to address this, I simulate portfolio evolution using the empirical distribution of port-
folio weight changes. For each herd (identified by benchmark) and for each quarter, I draw
portfolio weight changes from the empirical distribution under the null hypothesis of inde-
10CRSP collects the date at which the current manager begins management directly from the source. In
other words, if for example a fund is team managed, the manager tenure variable is determined by the date
at which the fund itself reports the ‘manager’ took control of the fund. I am unable to distinguish if this
represents the same team or team leader.
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pendence. I do this for each quarter. In other words, at the beginning of each quarter, each
fund begins with its actual portfolio weights and is assigned portfolio weight changes drawn
from the sample of changes from that quarter and herd.
Several particularities of portfolios make this not quite straightforward. Each fund
typically holds only a small fraction of the stocks owned by the herd and thus the majority
of its weights are zero, and remain zero. Additionally, a number of positions are initiated
over the quarter and others are closed out completely. There are likely several assumptions
one could make in order to simulate realistic portfolio evolution. The specific design I
describe below is relatively simple and matches statistics of actual portfolios relatively well.
I have bootstrapped under several different assumptions and results are robust to the exact
methodology.
For each benchmark group and in each quarter, I stratify the distribution of weight
changes based on the size of the position at the beginning of the quarter. I draw portfolio
weight changes with replacement from buckets based on the size of the initial portfolio weight.
If the fund has zero weight in a stock at the beginning of the quarter, its weight change is
drawn from the sample of actual weight changes across all funds and stocks in that herd
and quarter in which the beginning period weight is zero. For non-zero initial positions, the
weight change is drawn based on the level of ownership. I draw separately using 10, 25, 50,
75, and 90 percentile cutoffs. In these cases I draw the percentage of change in portfolio
weight. This accounts for closing out positions (−100% change) without generating short
positions. Last I normalize all funds’ portfolios such that ending period weights sum to 1.
By drawing changes from the zero-initial-weight distribution and using percentage
changes from non-zero distribution, I ensure that the number of stocks in the herd is unbiased.
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In each quarter the number of positions closed and the number initiated match expectations.
Results are not sensitive to the structure of the bootstrapping. This design is in
fact quite conservative, and results are generally stronger as assumptions are relaxed. By
conditioning on initial weight levels I hardwire any herding related to the size of position.
This table summarizes various statistics for the actual and simulated evolution of
portfolios. The output shows that the simulation matches the actual statistics quite well. I
use these simulated portfolios to test for differences in herding between the portfolios that
evolve independently (simulated) from the actual evolution of portfolios. In Table 2.3 Panel
A I report the mean direction of 0.08 as significantly greater than the simulated sample at
the 1% level.
2.3.4 Comparison with Other Herding Measures
To my knowledge, the only fund-level measure of herding that has been used in prior
literature is the FHM measure developed in Grinblatt et al. (1995). In this section I compare
FHM to direction.
The FHM measure is an aggregation within each fund of the LSV stock-level measure
of herding. The first step to compute FHM is to sign the LSV measure, meaning buy herding
is distinguished from sell herding. Second, for a given fund and quarter, the researcher adds
across stocks all of the times that the fund trades with the herd, weighting each trade by
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(wi,3t − wi,3t−3)(Ii,tLSVi,t − E[Ii,tLSVi,t]),
where w is the portfolio weight in stock i at time t, LSV is the stock-level herding measure
defined in Lakonishok et al. (1992), and I is an indicator variable set to 0 if there is in-
significant herd movement in the stock, 1 if there is significant herd buying and the fund is
a buyer OR if there is significant herd selling and the fund is a seller, and -1 if the there is
significant herd buying and the fund is a seller OR if there is significant herd selling and the
fund is a buyer.
This measure reflects the extent with which a fund is changing its portfolio in the same
direction as peers, when direction of trading is aggregated across all stocks. Conceptually
this is very similar to direction, however direction adds important aspects to the FHM metric.
First, direction allows for the distinction between active and passive portfolio decisions. That
is, FHM may indicate a fund to be perfectly herding even the fund has made no trades.
Through a simple adjustment to the portfolio weights direction makes this distinction. A
second, more important difference is that direction accounts for the (similarity in) magnitudes
of trades while FHM does not.
Consider the following example. Assume there are 100 mutual funds and three stocks,
A, B and C. 99 mutual funds increase their portfolio weights by 20% each in A and B, and
correspondingly decrease their portfolio weight in C by 40%. If the 100th mutual fund also
changes its portfolio by +20%, +20%, and -40%, then its direction would equal 1, perfect
11For a detailed description of the aggregation of LSV herding measure within each fund and quarter, see
Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995).
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herding. Any other portfolio change and the extent of herding would be less than perfect
(direction < 1). However, the FHM measure would make no distinction between trades of
+20%, +20%, and -40%, and trades of +0%, +40%, and -40%, for example. Also, a fund
that moves all of its money into A, for example, would be considered to be a stronger herder
than one that exactly mimicked the herd’s portfolio weight changes. This is avoided by using
variation in the data to directly measure behavior at the fund level, instead of first using
variation to create a stock measure, then aggregating this at the fund.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I develop a consistent and unifying framework for measuring herd
behavior. The framework generates manager-level measures of common portfolio evolution.
Multiple aspects of portfolio evolution are measured. These measures are compared to
portfolio evolution simulated under the null hypothesis of independent trading.
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Table 2.1
Summary of Fund Portfolios
I report the number of funds in the sample and the typical number of stocks they hold that can be matched to CRSP. I
also report summary statistics on portfolio weights conditional on positive ownership at the beginning or end of the quarter.
Importantly, I use all weights in all results going forward (included zero weights), however for illustrative purposes I summarize
only non-zero weights in this table. active portfolio weight changes are changes in excess of that which would occur to passively
holding the stock and realizing returns.
# funds 2089
# herds 19
avg # funds / qtr 461
avg # stocks held / qtr / fund 102
avg # stocks held / qtr / herd 1243
Portfolio characteristics
(conditional on positive ownership at beginning or end of quarter)
Mean Std Dev Min Max
weight 0.83% 1.05% 0.00% 100%
|∆ weight| 0.39% 0.61% 0.00% 100%




The top portion of the table describes Measures of individual fund portfolios and how they evolve are described in the top panel. Below that are
description and definitions of herding measures. Italics are scalars, boldface are vectors. Bounds for scalars are reported in the far right column. I
also report a conceptual equivalence when possible.
Portfolio Measures Description Definition
wf,t vector of portfolio weights at time t 〈wf,t,1, wf,t,2, ...〉,
for fund f where wf,t,i =
sharesf,t,i∗pt,i
tnaf,t


















Herd Measures Equivalence bounds
directionf,t direction relative to herd
∆wf,t•∆hf,t
||∆wf,t|| ||∆hf,t||
uncentered or non- [-1,1]
Pearson correlation






Summary of Measures of Fund Behavior
Summary statistics on measures of portfolio evolution are reported in Panel A. distance reflects the similarity between a
fund’s holdings and those of the peer portfolio, distancef,t = ||wf,t − hf,t||, which is the root sum squared errors between
their portfolio weights. direction summarizes the similarity in portfolio weight changes, and equals the uncentered correlation
between the fund and herd portfolio weight changes,
∆wf,t•∆hf,t
||∆wf,t|| ||∆hf,t||
. The stars in Panel A reflect significance of the
direction variable compared to simulated portfolios (see Appendix). For exposition, at the bottom of Panel A I summarize
the variables ignoring all portfolio weights that are zero. Panel B shows the empirical distributions of distance and direction.
Panel C presents results on the persistence of distance and direction. In each quarter I sort funds into quintiles on either
distance or direction. I track the average of these measures for each quintile for 8 quarters. In the table below I report the
difference in the top and bottom quartile. For example, the bottom right cell shows that funds which were in the top quintile
of direction 8 quarters ago now have direction that is 0.067 higher than funds that were in the bottom quartile 8 quarters
ago. The t-statistic is computed using the time series of cross sectional average differences between the top and bottom quintiles.
Panel A: Summary Statistics mean median std dev 10% 90%
distance 0.127 0.122 0.041 0.081 0.180
direction 0.080*** 0.0512*** 0.117 -0.026 0.224
distance [only non-zero weights] 0.096 0.089 0.032 0.063 0.137
direction [only non-zero weights] 0.157*** 0.133*** 0.204 -0.069 0.431
Panel B: Histograms
Panel C: Persistence - Top minus Bottom Quintile (5-1)
quarter t+
+1 +2 +3 +4 +8
distance (5-1) 0.103 0.100 0.098 0.096 0.090
(83.04) (77.99) (69.41) (72.83) (48.69)
direction (5-1) 0.010 0.084 0.087 0.082 0.067




The top panel summarizes these measures for the full sample, 1990-2006. The second panel reports mean fund characteristics
by directionc ranked quarterly. The third panel reports means by convergencec quintile. Fund assets, expenses, turnover and
returns are obtained from CRSP and merged using. Flows are computed from CRSP using returns and asset values. They are
presented as a fraction of assets and are winsorized at 1 and 99%. activeshare is from Cremers and Petajisto (2009). return
gap is from Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008).
Mean Median Std Dev
assets 912 189 3392
expenses 1.27% 0.0122 0.0045
turnover 0.84 0.62 0.82
lag flows 2.05% -0.96% 17.25%
fund age 3.4 2.25 3.7
manager tenure 2.0 1.25 2.5
activeshare 0.78 0.81 0.17
return gap (bps) -6 0 249
fundret (bps) 273 294 1079
lead fundret (bps) 254 294 1051
subsample means
direction
Lo 1 2 3 Hi
assets 836 659 782 955 1352
expense ratio 1.28% 1.32% 1.30% 1.26% 1.21%
turnover 0.74 0.79 0.86 0.90 0.89
lag flows 2.10% 2.30% 2.28% 2.15% 1.47%
activeshare 0.81 0.84 0.80 0.75 0.68
return gap (bps) -6 -2 -6 -3 -13
fundret (bps) 260 276 284 279 265
lead fundret (bps) 244 299 270 247 210
distance 0.141 0.137 0.127 0.121 0.112
direction -0.037 0.018 0.058 0.116 0.246
distance
Lo 1 2 3 Hi
assets 1409 1238 821 568 549
expense ratio 1.18% 1.24% 1.28% 1.32% 1.36%
turnover 0.83 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.69
lag flow 2.30% 1.88% 1.51% 2.21% 2.28%
activeshare 0.62 0.74 0.80 0.84 0.88
return gap (bps) -2 -1 1 -8 -22
fundret (bps) 233 234 228 249 248
lead fundret (bps) 231 236 228 225 245
distance 0.078 0.105 0.122 0.143 0.190
direction 0.119 0.097 0.080 0.063 0.042
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Table 2.5
Comparison of Actual and Simulated Portfolios
In each quarter I use actual starting portfolio weights and simulate portfolio evolution under the null hypothesis of independent
weight changes. For each fund-quarter-stock I draw changes from the empirical distribution of changes from all peer funds
in that quarter. The first two rows compare the change in weights and the ending portfolio weights for the non-zero portion
of funds’ portfolios, i.e. conditional on positive ownership at the beginning of the quarter. The next two rows summarize
positions that are initiated, then I summarize positions that are closed out. The next last two columns summarize all
portfolio weights, including all zero ownership positions. Last I show the measures of portfolio evolution in the simulated sample.
actual simulated
mean std dev mean std dev
|wt > 0
∆wt -0.132% 0.586% -0.131% 0.696%
wt+1 0.851% 1.090% 0.852% 1.160%
|wt = 0 and wt+1 > 0
∆wt 0.759% 0.797% 0.733% 0.772%
wt+1 0.759% 0.797% 0.733% 0.772%
|wt > 0 and wt+1 = 0
∆w -0.690% 0.830% -0.750% 0.900%
wt+1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
full sample
∆wt -3.71e-4% 0.192% -4.98e-4% 0.213%
wt+1 0.064% 0.365% 0.064% 0.379%
Herding measures: full sample
direction 0.079 0.116 0.055 0.071
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Chapter 3
An Empirical Examination of the Motives of Herd
Behavior
In this chapter I apply the framework for measuring common portfolio evolution
developed in Chapter 2 to data on quarterly mutual fund holdings over the 1990-2006 period
in an effort to provide evidence on the motives that lead to herd behavior.
3.1 Introduction and Literature Review
Managers may herd because they are reacting to correlated information [e.g. Froot
et al. (1992), Hirshleifer et al. (1994)] or they may be responding to the information in the
trades of their peers [e.g. Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Avery and Zemsky
(1998)]. On the other hand, herd behavior may be the outcome of an agency problem between
the manager and shareholders [e.g. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Lakonishok et al. (1994),
Chevalier and Ellison (1999)]. In this setting the manager’s self interests, i.e. career concerns,
may make it costly to deviate from peers. From the standpoint of the econometrician, the
distinction between managers trading together because of similar information and managers
trading together because of agency problems is difficult to determine.
I apply the herding measures developed in Chapter 2 to the data in order to distinguish
the motives of herding. These measures are useful for a few reasons. First, by measuring
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herding at the fund-level I can examine fund qualities associated with herding, such as
manager tenure and fund performance. Second, by examining similarity in holdings and
similarity in trades in a single framework, I can test how these two behaviors relate to each
other. This is useful because all theories of herding predict correlated trading, but career
concerns is foremost a theory for correlated holdings.1
If fund managers herd because of career concerns, then herd behavior should be
strongest among younger, inexperienced managers, and these funds should perform poorly
in the cross section.2 Also, if funds trade together because of career concerns then we would
expect these funds to have portfolio levels that deviate very little from their peers. I find that
funds with similar holdings have managers with short-tenure and low future performance.
These same characteristics also describe funds with similar trades. Additionally, most corre-
lated trading arises from the funds that hold very common portfolios and not from the funds
that are willing to hold atypical portfolios. These results provide evidence that correlated
trading is the outcome of the incentive for correlated holdings, and therefore that career
concerns is an important driver of herd behavior.
To provide additional support, I test a conditional relationship between herding and
performance. If the underperformance of funds with similar trades is driven by career con-
cerns, then we would expect this effect to be strongest among funds that are also trading
1This concept is summarized by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) in the following quote regarding the
bull market of 1987, “The consensus among professional money managers was that price levels were too
high...However, few money managers were eager to sell. If the market did continue to go up, they were
afraid of being perceived as lone fools. On the other hand, in the more likely event of a market decline, there
would be comfort in numbers.”
2Career concerns should result in lower performance in the cross section either because these managers
push prices away from fundamentals [Grinblatt et al. (1995)], or because they are ignoring profitable infor-
mation while those without career concerns are not [Scharfstein and Stein (1990)].
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towards the holdings of their peers. I find that, unconditionally, funds that trade together
underperform those with independent trades by 25 bps per quarter. Funds that are trading
together and towards the holdings of their peers underperform by 76 bps per quarter.
3.2 Hypotheses Development
While correlated signals and career concerns are two of the more prominent theories
of herding, there are other potential explanations. These include but are not limited to;
changing preferences, irrationality, benchmark rebalancing, and liquidity-driven trading. I
make an effort to control for some of these effects but otherwise do not speak directly to
these alternative explanations. In this section I discuss in more detail how information or
career concerns could lead to correlated trade behavior and how these different theories might
uniquely manifest themselves in the data.
The focus of this paper is on contemporaneously correlated trading and holdings -
where contemporaneous is defined as intra-quarter. Some theories of herding suggest that
peers’ trades need to be observable while others do not. First I discuss how the theories
could result in contemporaneously correlated traded as measured using quarterly holdings
data. Then I describe the fund and manager characteristics that we would expect to covary
with herd behavior according to the theories. Last I describe predictions for how similarity
in holdings should be related to similarity in trades.
3.2.1 Timing
In short, both information or career concerns could lead to either contemporaneous
or lead-lag herding. It is clear that correlated information could lead to contemporaneously
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correlated trading. If fund managers obtain similar signals, then we would expect to find
evidence of contemporaneous herding in trades as long as the managers are receiving their
signals within the same quarter. Even if one set of investors consistently learn the information
early in the quarter relative to other informed investors, herding is still likely [e.g. Hirshleifer
et al. (1994)].
Informed trading can also show up as lead-lag herding. Generally, information cas-
cades do not apply to settings in which prices adjust to information. However under some
conditions, like those described in Avery and Zemsky (1998), a following group of funds may
mimic the trades of a leading group because there is information in these trades. Again,
lead-lag herding is not the focus of this chapter, but I do address it briefly.
Similarly, career concerns can generate either contemporaneous or cross-autocorrelated
herding, although the mechanisms here are less clear. Interestingly, the literature that mea-
sures contemporaneously correlated trading often uses agency problems as potential motiva-
tion, but the connection between the two is somewhat incomplete.
There are several reasons to expect that career concerns may generate intra-quarter
similarity in trades. First, a group of funds may have contemporaneously correlated trades
- and thus be contemporaneously herding - because they are mimicking something. Fund
manager might observe the holdings of their peers and trade towards them over the quarter.
In a sense this is nothing more than rebalancing towards the herd portfolio. Because returns
continuously reshape stock-space, managers need to trade in order to offset this effect of
returns. If funds share deviations, which is what we would expect under career concerns,
then the trades required to rebalance will be correlated. Importantly, the trades of these
funds are correlated contemporaneously, and may or may not also be cross-autocorrelated
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with other funds’ trades.
Or, it may be the case that trades do occur with a lag, we simply do not observe
this due to data granularity. Some managers may trade together over the quarter because
they observe each others’ trades intra-quarter. Survey evidence compiled by Robert Shiller
and John Pound in 1989 suggests this may be the case. The authors find that the majority
of institutional investors claimed that their interest in new stock positions was driven by
communication with other investment professionals. Importantly, these communications
occurred contemporaneously with the acquisition of the position, “the time of maximum
conversations for institutional investors tends to come after some purchases are made but
while they are still purchasing” (p. 58).
Career concerns could also generate lead-lag herding. Career concerns predicts that
fund managers want to mimic the holdings of their peers. This may require them to con-
stantly mimic the trades of their peers, thus generating lead-lag herding.
3.2.2 Fund and Manager Characteristics
If funds herd because of their managers’ career concerns we would expect herding
to be strongest among managers with characteristics that positively covary with the agency
problem between managers and shareholders. The agency problem that generates career
concerns is likely the most severe among younger, less entrenched managers, and those who
have recently performed poorly [Chevalier and Ellison(1999)]. Specifically, a manager early
in his career has more at risk in terms of his human capital and so in the basic sense has higher
career concerns. Similarly, the posterior probability that a seasoned manager is high ability
will vary little from the ex ante expectation relative to that of a newly minted manager. On
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the other hand, if funds herd because their managers are informed, we would expect herding
to be strongest among the more experienced fund managers (as these are the managers
that have survived the job market) and these funds should have a strong performance track
record.
I use manager tenure as a proxy for the magnitude of the agency problem between
the manager and shareholders. This is obtained using the variable in CRSP that indicates
the date the current manager took over management of the portfolio. As discussed earlier,
manager tenure is defined as the difference in years between this date and the date at which
the reported holdings are valid.3
3.2.3 Fund Performance
If managers ignore their information because of an incentive to maintain similar port-
folios, these funds should underperform those willing to trade away from the herd. On the
other hand if fund managers appear to herd because they are trading on the same signals,
these funds should outperform those with managers that are not trading on the signal. I use
the Carhart 4-factor model to adjust fund performance for risk and show that results are
robust to using the 7 benchmark-based factors as defined in Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz
(2010).4 Both of these include a momentum factor to account for the previously documented
positive relation between herding and momentum trading [Grinblatt et al. (1995)].
3This date at which the current manager took over the portfolio is provided by CRSP. In cases of team
managed funds, CRSP reports whatever date is reported to them by the mutual fund. I use this tenure
variable in all cases and include an indicator variable for team managed funds.
4These data are provided by the authors at http://www.petajisto.net/data.html
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3.2.4 Relation Between Holdings and Trades
In the results that follow, I provide evidence consistent with a setting in which funds
with information tend to hold high distance portfolios, and funds hampered by agency prob-
lems tend to hold low distance portfolios. This is consistent with both the theory of career
concerns [Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zweibel (1995)] and previous empirical evidence [e.g.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Dass et al. (2009)]. Given this, then if funds trade together
because of the incentive to hold similar portfolios, we would expect the correlated trading
that we observe to arise from the funds that maintain portfolio holdings similar to the herd.
On the other hand if correlated trading is the outcome of informed trading then we would
expect these trades to arise predominantly among those funds willing to hold atypical port-
folios. Additionally, the trades should serve the purpose of maintaining or increasing the
similarity in holdings if funds trade together because of agency problems. There is no rea-
son to expect that correlated trading due to information should result in holdings becoming
more or less similar over time - sometimes trading on information may move their portfolios
towards the holdings of their peers, and other times away.
More specifically, if career concerns drives herding then we would expect to find
∂directiont
∂distancet
< 0. And the trades of these funds should on average maintain or increase the
similarity in holdings over time, ∂distancet+n
∂directiont
|distancet < 0. If information drives herding then
we should find ∂directiont
∂distancet
> 0. And the trades of these funds are not likely to have an effect
of increasing or decreasing similarity in holdings over time, ∂distancet+n
∂directiont
|distancet = 0
To summarize, either correlated signals or career concerns could lead to contempora-
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neously correlated trading.5 If fund managers herd because of agency problems (information)
then herding should be negatively (positively) related to tenure and negatively (positively) re-
lated to future performance. We would expect these herding funds to have similar(dissimilar)
holdings and to be trading towards (independent of) the holdings of their peers.
3.3 Results
In this section I examine the lagged manager and fund characteristics that relate to
herding in trades and herding in levels. I also examine the performance of these funds going
forward. Then I examine the interaction between the two types of herd behaviors.
3.3.1 Similarity in Holdings: distance
The Euclidean distance between the fund and herd portfolio reflects the similarity in
portfolio weight levels, and this is equivalent to the root sum of squared errors between the
two vectors of portfolio weights at the beginning of the quarter. As discussed earlier, this
is related to other static measures of active portfolio management, such as activeshare [Cre-
mers and Petajisto (2009)], ICI [Kacperczyk et al. (2005)] and SectorDeviation [Chevalier
and Ellison (1999)]. In this section I examine the lagged characteristics that describe the
distribution of distance and how distance relates to subsequent fund performance.
The first column in Table 3.1 shows results from a pooled OLS specification with
year and peer group effects. Funds with similar holdings are those that are close to the herd,
i.e. low distance. Results indicate that these low distance funds tend to have low expenses
5Similarly, both could also lead to cross-autocorrelations. I examine this is a later section.
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and higher turnover, and more assets under management. Importantly, after controlling
for several fund characteristics, managers with short tenures are much more likely to have
holdings similar to peers. The coefficient on manager tenure is 0.0022, indicating that a
manager with 10 years less tenure holds a portfolio that is 0.022 closer to the herd. This is
a considerable difference given an unconditional average distance of 0.127. Column 2 shows
that all of these relationships are robust to median specification with bootstrapped standard
errors.
The last two columns report odds ratios from a logit specification with dependent
variable that equals one for high distance funds (column 3) or low distance funds (column 4).
A manager with one additional year tenure is 1.19 times more likely to have a portfolio in the
top quintile of distance, and 0.95 times likely to have a portfolio in the bottom quintile. In
general, these results provide evidence that career concerns affect some managers’ portfolio
decisions. They are consistent with a setting in which fund managers with career concerns
tend to hold portfolios similar to peers, and funds that trade on their information tend to
end up holdings atypical portfolios.
Next I examine the relationship between the similarity in holdings and future per-
formance. In Table 3.2 I report results from a Fama MacBeth specification regressing next
quarter alpha on distance and controls. To estimate fund Carhart alpha I regress monthly
fund returns from CRSP on zero cost market, size, book-to-market, and momentum port-
folios. Alternatively, I also use a benchmark-based 7 factor model as defined in Cremers,
Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2010), which I refer to as CPZ alpha.6 I use 5 year rolling windows
6These data are provided by the authors at http://www.petajisto.net/data.html
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and require at least 8 quarters (24 monthly observations) to estimate factor loadings. Using
these factor loading I estimate the fund alpha over quarter t. I then regress the cross section
of fund alphas in quarter t on distance and controls, both measured at quarter t − 1. The
additional explanatory variables are fund age, expenses, turnover, fund flows, and log of
assets under management. All standard errors use Newey-West correction with maximum
lags.
The dependent variable is next quarter’s alpha in basis points. Column 2 reports the
Fama MacBeth coefficients on lagged distance and controls. This shows that the relation be-
tween distance and performance is positive and significant both statistically and economically.
A top-minus-bottom quintile portfolio on distance spreads gross returns (0.19−0.078)∗339 =
38 bps over the subsequent quarter, or 1.52% annually.
The next columns use dummies for high and low distance instead of the continuous
variable. These results show that the positive relation is driven by the outperformance of
funds with very different portfolios. Portfolios in the top quintile of distance outperform
all other funds by 38 bps over the next quarter. In column 5 I include activeshare as an
explanatory variable. The coefficient on distance drops moderately (from 339 in column 2 to
319 in column 5) and remains statistically and economically significant. The coefficient on
activeshare is not distinguishable from zero. The last column shows that results are robust
to an alternate risk adjustment that uses factors based on benchmark returns.
These results suggest that funds whose portfolio decisions are influenced by career
concerns tend to be located in the middle of the pack, ie. low distance. And funds that seem
to trade on valuable information have portfolios that are quite different from peers. Specifi-
cally, funds willing to hold atypical portfolios tend to be small funds with high expenses and
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their managers have long tenure. Their holdings seem to reflect skill or information as these
funds outperform. In contrast, funds with portfolio weights that are closest to the average of
their peers charge low fees and are managed by short-tenure managers. These funds under-
perform relative to their counterparts that hold atypical portfolios. Together, these results
are consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and both Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and
Kacperczyk et al. (2005). Chevalier and Ellison find that younger managers get fired more
quickly and tend to hold industry weights similar to their peers. Cremers and Petajisto, and
Kacperczyk et al. find a positive relationship between their measures of active management
and performance.
3.3.2 Herding: direction
I use the cosine of the angle θ between the fund and herd vectors in order to mea-
sure the direction of trading. The cosine of θ is bounded [-1,1], where perfect herding is
direction = cos(0) = 1, orthogonal trading is direction = cos(90◦) = 0 and perfect con-
trarian trading is direction = cos(180◦) = −1. In order to examine the characteristics that
describe the distribution I regress direction on lagged characteristics and include time and
peer group indicator variables. These results are presented in Table 3.3.
The specifications used here are the same as in Table 3.1. Funds with similar trades
(high direction) have managers with short tenure. A manager with 10 years longer tenure
has a measure of similarity in trades that is −0.03 lower. This is quite large compared to
an unconditional mean of 0.08. Funds with similar trades also tend to have low expenses,
high turnover, and high assets under management. These relationship hold using a median
regression specification. The right two columns show that the tenure-direction relationship
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is driven by both the upper and lower end of the distribution. One additional year tenure
means the manager is 0.95 times more likely to be in the top quintile of direction and 1.05
times more likely to be in the bottom quintile.
The relationship between performance and herding in trades is examined in Table
3.4. I use the same specifications as in Table 3.2. Fama MacBeth regressions show a signif-
icantly negative relationship between herding in trades and subsequent performance. After
controlling for size, flows, turnover, expenses, and fund age, a top-bottom quintile portfolio
spreads returns (0.246 −−0.037) ∗ −87 = −25 bps per quarter, or 1.00% annually.
Interestingly, columns 3 and 4 show that the relationship is driven by both the un-
derperformance of funds that trade together, and the outperformance of contrarian funds.
Funds in the top quintile of similarity in trades underperform by 25 bps over the next quar-
ter. Funds in the bottom quintile outperform by 11 bps. Both are statistically significant.
These effects persist after controlling for activeshare and using CPZ benchmark alphas.
In summary, funds with similar trades tend to have managers with short tenure and
they underperform relative to funds with more independent trades. These same relationships
also describe funds that herd in holdings. The result that they share common characteristics
suggests that they may be one in the same. I test this in the following section.
3.3.3 The Interaction between direction and distance
The results in the previous sections indicate that funds that herd in portfolio levels
as well as those that herd in portfolio changes tend to be managed by individuals with short
tenures, and these funds subsequently underperform other funds with more independent
holdings and trades. These results are consistent with career concerns incentives to herd.
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In this section I provide a few pieces of additional evidence supporting career concerns as
a mechanism underlying both herding in holdings and herding in trades. Because career
concerns is primarily a theory for correlated holdings and correlated trading is merely the
outcome of the incentive to maintain similar portfolios, I test if these two herd behaviors
are related. That is, do funds that trade together do so because of an incentive to maintain
similar portfolios?
If correlated trading is due to career concerns we would expect high direction funds
to have similar holdings (low distance), and to trade in such a way that this similarity is
maintained. The first evidence of a connection between these two herd behaviors is provided
in the summary statistics in Table 3.4. There is a very strong negative relationship between
distance and direction, indicating that funds located near the herd are precisely those likely
to exhibit correlated trading. The bottom quintile of direction has average distance equal to
0.141. This value among the top quintile of funds is 0.112 (Table 3.4). The t-statistic on the
time series of the differences in cross-sectional sample means is 38.45.
A more detailed picture is presented in Figure 3.1 which shows the joint distribution.
This shows that funds with similar trades (Hi direction) tend to have holdings that do not
deviate much from their peers (Lo distance). Funds with independent/contrarian trades (Lo
direction) tend to have holdings that deviate greatly from their peers (Hi distance).
These herding measures are endogenously determined by the same vector of beginning
of quarter portfolio weights, and so it may be more interesting to examine not the location
of funds that herd in trades, but where these funds are going. In Panel A, using a pooled
OLS specification with quarter and benchmark effects and fund clusters, I regress distance
at time t + n on direction at time t − 1 and control for distance at time t − 1. Column 1 in
41
Table 3.5 shows that, conditional on beginning of quarter similarity in holdings, funds with
similar trades tend to have portfolios very close to the herd two periods later (coefficient=-
0.005, tstat=-3.54). These regressions include controls for fund return performance, flows,
turnover, expenses and log assets. This effect persists for several quarters going forward.
To mitigate concern that this is mechanical, I show results repeating the analysis using
simulated portfolios. For each fund I use the actual beginning of quarter portfolio weights
and draw randomly with replacement portfolio weight changes from the contemporaneous
empirical distribution of its peers. I draw from buckets based on the initial portfolio weight,
e.g. zero ownership positions are drawn from other zero ownership positions (details in
Appendix). The results using simulated portfolio evolution are reported in Panel B of Table
3.5. If anything, funds that trade together by chance tend to be trading away from the
holdings of their peers7. These results show that funds that trade together tend to be
trading towards the holdings of the herd.
Last, I examine a conditional direction-performance relationship. direction is a noisy
reflection of herd behavior - because of both measurement error and chance. If the pre-
viously documented negative relationship between similarity in trades and performance is
not spurious, but reflects agency problems associated with career concerns, then we would
expect the underperformance to be driven by the funds that are also trading towards the
holdings of the herd. In Table 3.6 I repeat the performance regressions from Table 3.4 and
use subsamples based on whether or not the fund is trading towards the holding of its peers.
7My conjecture is that this is because portfolio weights are bounded [0,1]. If a fund has an initial weight
of zero and its peers on average sell, then the fund cannot have a positively correlated trade in this stock,
and its position wil generally become more similar to peers.
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In each quarter I rank funds based on the change in the similarity in their holdings.
Funds in the top quintile (strongly trading towards the holdings of their peers) in each
quarter are used in columns 1 and 3, all others in columns 2 and 4. Specifically, I compute
the percentage change in distance adjusted for the impact of returns on portfolio holdings.8
Results show that the negative direction-performance relationship is driven by the funds that
are trading towards the holdings of their peers. The impact of direction on performance is
−271 among funds trading towards the holdings of their peers. This is quite large relative
to the effect among the remainder of funds (−38), or relative to the effect among the full
sample (−87, Column 2 of Table 3.4). Specifically the top-minus-bottom quintile spread is
(0.245−−0.037) ∗−271 = 76. This is three times the unconditional effect. This conditional
relationship persists using the alternate benchmark-factor risk adjustment shown in columns
3 and 4.
3.4 Robustness Tests
In this section I show that the manager tenure and performance relationships are
not sensitive to the specific definition of direction. In Table 3.7 I show that the negative
relationship between tenure and herding persists across several fund-level measures of herd-
ing. The first three columns use herding measures computed within each benchmark group
and columns 4-6 compute measures across all funds. In column 1 the dependent variable
is FHM as defined in Grinblatt et al. (1995) and discussed in more detail in the previous
chapter. It is calculated for each fund and quarter within each peer group. Column 2 uses







FHM computed after defining all funds as peer funds. Column 3 uses directiontrd, which is
the direction measure calculated after setting all portfolio weight changes to zero if the fund
did not change the number of shares owned. Column 4 uses the standard direction measure
computed defining all funds in the sample as peer funds.
The coefficient on mgr tenure is negative and significant in all cases. This indicates
that the negative relationship between tenure and herding is robust to several measures of
herding.
Table 3.8 repeats the performance regressions of Tables 3.4 and 3.6, but I use a number
of different calculations of the two measures. The first variant is a moving average of distance
and direction over the previous 4 quarters. Because these measures, particularly direction are
noisy we may expect to better identify herding funds by those with consistently high direction
or consistently low distance. Second, when controlling for the effect of returns I use returns
without dividends9. Third, I use only the non-zero holdings of funds when computing the
herding measures. This has the drawback of ignoring differences in the breadth of ownership
but might arguably better reflecting active management of portfolios. Fourth, I measure
behavior relative to a value-weighted herd vector. This would be a better approximation of
the peer portfolio if we assume that the trades of larger funds are more informative or if
fund managers are evaluated relative to large funds more often than relative to small funds.
Last I compute the measures in industry space instead of stock space. This would be the
appropriate methodology if information exists primarily at the industry level or if variation
9The effect that returns will passively have on portfolio weights depends on the assumption of what fund
managers do with cash distributions. If managers reinvest into the stocks from which the dividends came
then the correct return adjustment is to use returns with dividends. If fund managers pay out the dividends
to shareholders then the correct return adjustment is to use returns without dividends.
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in fund performance largely depends on industry, not stock, weights.
I report results on alternate definitions of distance in Panel A. The standard controls
are included but not reported for brevity. distance remains a significant predictor of perfor-
mance in all cases. The coefficient in column 5 is consistent with Kacperczyk et al. (2005)
who find a positive relationship between a fund’s market adjusted industry Herfindahl.
In Panel B I show results using alternate definitions of direction. The first column uses
the average over the previous 4 quarters. Results indicate that this is likely to be a more
precise measure of fund herding. The top-minus-bottom quintile spread in returns using
direction is (0.208 − −0.007) ∗ −228 = −49 bps per quarter, about twice the effect using
the typical direction measure. The second column shows that results are robust to using
returns without dividends to control for passive portfolio weight changes. The third column
shows that restricting computations to use only non-zero holdings results in approximately
the same estimated effect as the standard definition of direction. The top-bottom spread for
direction is (0.44−−0.09)∗−50 = −27 bps using non-zero holdings. Last, I show results using
measures computed in industry-space. I find no significant relationship between direction
measured in industry space and performance.
3.5 Leaders and Followers
Results up to this point have focused on contemporaneous herding. Specifically, a
fund’s portfolio weight changes have been compared to its peers weight changes over the same
quarter. In this section I report the descriptors and performance of leading and following
funds. That is, what characteristics describe funds whose trades predict the next quarter
trades of its peers? How do these leading funds subsequently perform. Similarly, which funds
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trades mimic those of its peers and how do these following funds perform?
These questions are important to understand because they add to our understanding
of herding motives. The primary difference in the economic setting between contemporaneous
vs. lead-lag behavior is observability. The career concerns motive of herding requires some
type of observability. In the previous section regressions were designed to test if herding
funds are trading towards the observable holdings of peers. In this section I test if there is a
group of funds whose trades mimic the observable trades of peers. Importantly, these funds
may or may not be contemporaneously herding.
The information motive of herding is slightly different in a lead-lag setting. If the herd
is following a group of leaders for information reasons, then there needs to be a reason that
this (observable) information is not priced. Generally these information cascade theories do
not apply to capital markets settings in which prices adjust. However Avery and Zemsky
(1998) describe an economic setting with dynamic prices in which information cascades can
still occur. Furthermore, Pomorski (2009) shows empirically that mutual funds sometimes
mimic the trades of previously outperforming funds, and that the trades of these following
funds continue to perform well. So, despite the general non-applicability of information
cascade theories to capital markets with dynamic prices, we have reason to believe that
information cascades may describe mutual fund trading.
The identification of leading and following funds is straightforward. To identify lead-
ers, for each fund I compute the direction measure using a fund’s portfolio weight changes






Similarly, to compute following funds I use a funds weight changes over t and those





So, every fund has a leading and following measure, and to be clear, following funds
need not be following leaders, and leaders need not be leading followers. Everything is
measured relative to the herd, meaning leaders lead the herd, and followers follow the herd -
so followers are quite indirectly following leaders as identified here. In the following section
I report the fund and manager characteristics that describe the cross-sectional distributions
of these metrics, and how these distributions relate to future performance.
3.5.1 Leaders and Followers: Results
First I examine the lagged fund and manager characteristics that describe the distri-
butions of measures of leading and following. Table 3.9 reports coefficients from a pooled
OLS specification, regressing leader or follower on lagged characteristics. All regressions
include year and benchmark effects.
The first three columns show results using leader as the dependent variable. Column 1
shows that a fund is likely to lead others if it has performed well in the past, as the coefficient
on perf perc (percentile rank of performance) is positive and significant. In columns 2 and 3,
lagged measures of leader are included. These coefficients are insignificant, indicating that
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leading (or being followed) is not persistent after controlling for other manager and fund
characteristics.
In columns 4-6 I examine the descriptors of follower. The coefficients in column 4
show that following funds tend to have performed poorly in the past and have low turnover.
The coefficients on followert−1 and followert−4 in columns 5 and 6 respectively, are positive
and significant. This indicates that there is a persistent group of following funds.
Evidence from these cross sectional regressions shows that leading funds have ex-
hibiting strong prior performance, and following funds have delivered weak performance in
the past. In Table 3.10 I examine the future performance of mutual funds as a function
of leading and following behavior. The information cascade theory of lead-lag herding pre-
dicts that both leaders and followers are trading on profitable information. Career concerns
predicts that following funds underperform in absolute terms (by pushing prices away from
fundamentals) or relative to other funds (by ignoring information).
3.6 Conclusion
Correlated trading among mutual fund managers may be the outcome of informed
trading or managerial career concerns. In order to distinguish these theories, I use a novel
framework to generate two fund-level measures of herd behavior. I measure the direction
a fund is trading relative to its peers. This measure is the portfolio-level analog to the
stock-level measure of herding used in previous literature [Lakonishok et al. (1994)]. The
second measure of herd behavior is the difference between the fund’s holdings and its peers.
This holdings-based measure is motivated by career concerns. While all theories of herding
generally predict correlated trading, a career concerns theory of herding is primarily about
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correlated holdings.
I use these fund-level measures of herd behavior to distinguish career concerns mo-
tivations from informed trading in two ways. First I examine which fund qualities describe
the cross sectional distributions of these measures. Second, I examine how the two herd
behaviors relate to each other.
I find that funds with similar holdings have managers with less experience and these
funds have low future performance. This is consistent with a career concerns theory of
herding - managers have an incentive to ignore their signals and maintain similar holdings.
I find similar relationship among funds that herd in trades. Correlated trading among funds
is strongest among funds with short tenure managers, and these funds have low future
performance. Consistent with this, I find that the majority of correlated trading arises from
funds that hold portfolios that are very similar to their peers. I confirm that funds with
similar trades are more likely to be trading towards the holdings of their peers.
Overall, results are consistent with a model of career concerns in which fund managers
ignore information in order to stick together. Importantly, the findings in this paper suggest
that at least some managers are informed. The negative herding-performance relationships
suggests that fund managers who are willing to hold atypical portfolios or make uncommon
trades do particularly well in the cross section. Herding, while presumably optimal for the




The dependent variable is distance which is a fund-quarter measure of the similarity in portfolio weight levels relative to an
aggregate peer portfolio. Specifically,
distancef,t = ||wf,t − hf,t||,
where wf,t and hf,t are vectors of beginning of quarter portfolio weights for the fund and herd, respectively. The first column
uses a Pooled OLS specification with standard errors clustered at the fund. Column 2 reports results from a median regression
with bootstrapped standard errors. Columns 3 and 4 report odds ratios from a conditional logit specification. The dependent
variable in the third column equals one if distance is in the top quintile (ranked quarterly), zero otherwise. The dependent
variable in column 4 equals one if distance is in the bottom quintile, zero otherwise. All regressions include year and benchmark
indicator variables. All independent variables are lagged and obtained from CRSP. perf pctl is the relative performance of the
fund over the previous quarter in percentile, where 1 is highest fund return, 0 is lowest. mgr tenure is the length of time in
years in which manager has been with the fund and fund age is the time since inception, both in years.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Pooled Median Logit Logit
OLS Regression (odds ratios)
hi distance lo distance
distance dummy dummy
mgr tenuret−1 0.003*** 0.002*** 1.210*** 0.908***
(5.08) (7.46) (5.06) (-2.58)
fund aget−1 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.911*** 0.996
(-3.27) (-4.98) (-3.02) (-0.15)
team mgmtt−1 0.001 0.001 1.068 0.843
(0.73) (1.46) (0.53) (-1.40)
perf pctlt−1 0.001 0.001 1.052 0.942
(0.88) (0.77) (0.62) (-0.86)
flows/assetst−1 -0.002 0.002 1.358 1.102
(-0.46) (0.55) (1.19) (0.41)
turnovert−1 -0.004** -0.004*** 0.686** 1.042
(-2.50) (-5.82) (-2.47) (0.62)
expensest−1 0.017*** 0.017*** 2.253*** 0.385***
(5.62) (14.59) (5.22) (-4.90)
log(tna)t−1 -5.1e-07*** -3.6e-07*** 1.000* 1.000**
(-2.64) (-4.92) (-1.92) (2.26)
Observations 13405 13405 13400 13397
R-squared 0.10





For each fund and quarter I estimate factor loadings using the previous 5 years of monthly returns from CRSP (at least 2 years
required) and use these to compute the fund’s 4-factor Carhart alpha and 7-factor CPZ [Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz
(2010)] benchmark-based alpha. I report results from a Fama-MacBeth specification regressing the fund’s alpha (in bps) on
lagged distance and controls. Standard errors use Newey-West correction with maximum lags.
Carhart αt (quarterly) (bps) CPZ αt
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
distancet−1 279.4*** 339.1*** 319.1*** 275.2**
(3.78) (2.96) (2.73) (2.60)
hi distance dummyt−1 37.57***
(3.29)




fund aget−1 1.70* 1.75* 1.78* 1.47 -0.27
(1.76) (1.88) (1.93) (1.50) (-0.27)
expensest−1 -11.33 -12.25* -10.39 -12.27 0.79
(-1.59) (-1.87) (-1.49) (-1.55) (0.17)
turnovert−1 1.44 1.85 -1.28 0.65 7.22
(0.24) (0.33) (-0.25) (0.08) (1.50)
flows/assetst−1 50.47*** 52.75 52.51** 49.93** 61.84***
(2.75) (0.79) (2.47) (2.61) (4.59)
log(tna)t−1 -5.74** -6.05*** -8.09*** -5.27** -3.52
(-2.40) (-2.83) (-4.52) (-2.05) (-1.11)
Constant -62.42*** -28.97 10.64 28.89** -34.02 -41.34
(-3.87) (-1.58) (0.79) (2.05) (-1.32) (-1.59)
Observations 26604 16283 16283 16283 16283 16283




The dependent variable is direction which is a fund-quarter measure of the similarity in portfolio weight changes relative to an





where ∆wf,t and ∆hf,t are vectors of return-adjusted portfolio weight changes for the fund and herd, respectively. All
regressions include quarter and benchmark indicator variables. Column 2 uses a median regression specification. Columns
3 and 4 report odds ratios from a conditional logit specification. The dependent variable in the third column equals one if
direction is in the top quintile (ranked quarterly and within each herd group), zero otherwise. The dependent variable in
column 4 equals one if direction is in the bottom quintile, zero otherwise. All independent variables are lagged and obtained
from CRSP. perf pctl is the relative performance of the fund over the previous quarter in percentile, where 1 is highest fund
return, 0 is lowest. mgr tenure is the length of time in years in which manager has been with the fund and fundage is the time
since inception, both in years.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Pooled Median Logit Logit
OLS Regression (odds ratios)
hi direction lo direction
direction dummy dummy
mgr tenuret−1 -0.0027*** -0.0022*** 0.942*** 1.046***
(-3.24) (-3.70) (-3.18) (2.83)
fund aget−1 4.0e-05 0.0007 1.000 1.001
(0.06) (1.40) (0.02) (0.09)
team mgmtt−1 -0.004 -0.002 0.894 0.983
(-1.10) (-0.97) (-1.50) (-0.29)
perf pctlt−1 0.002 -0.003 1.010 0.965
(0.57) (-1.09) (0.14) (-0.47)
flows/assetst−1 -0.007 -0.009 0.671** 1.111
(-0.76) (-1.51) (-2.06) (0.58)
turnovert−1 0.010*** 0.012*** 1.190*** 0.800***
(4.07) (7.75) (3.89) (-3.33)
expensest−1 -0.028*** -0.019*** 0.569*** 1.246***
(-5.61) (-7.94) (-5.11) (2.70)
log(tna)t−1 1.5e-06*** 1.8e-06*** 1.000*** 1.000
(2.95) (5.43) (2.62) (-1.41)
Observations 13405 13405 13400 13395
R-squared 0.16





For each fund and quarter I estimate factor loadings using the previous 5 years of monthly returns from CRSP (at least 2
years required) and use these to compute the fund’s 4-factor Carhart alpha and 7-factor CPZ [Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz
(2010)] alpha. I report results from a Fama-MacBeth specification regressing the fund’s alpha (in bps) on lagged direction
and controls. Control variables are fund age, expenses, turnover, fund flows, and log assets. Standard errors use Newey-West
correction with maximum lags.
Carhart αt (quarterly) (bps) CPZ αt
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
directiont−1 -79.56*** -86.84** -78.07** -86.11**
(-2.71) (-2.48) (-2.32) (-3.64)
hi direction dummyt−1 -25.01**
(-2.48)




fund aget−1 1.54* 1.69* 1.51* 1.35 -0.52
(1.68) (1.86) (1.66) (1.40) (-0.74)
expensest−1 -11.10 -11.27 -9.11 -13.92* -0.56
(-1.45) (-1.59) (-1.24) (-1.70) (-0.05)
turnovert−1 -0.15 -0.25 -0.30 -1.41 5.87
(-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.13) (-0.35) (1.45)
flows/assetst−1 59.05*** 60.19*** 54.12** 57.91*** 71.75***
(3.14) (3.19) (2.58) (2.88) (5.20)
log(tna)t−1 -7.30*** -7.21*** -7.71*** -6.74*** -4.22*
(-4.37) (-4.21) (-4.60) (-3.38) (-1.80)
Constant -19.33 32.24* 29.78** 24.24* -3.57 10.69
(-1.31) (2.18) (2.07) (1.77) (-0.23) (0.85)
Observations 26604 16283 16283 16283 16283 16283
Number of groups 67 62 62 62 62 62
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Figure 3.1
Joint Distribution of distance and direction
The figure below is a histogram of the joint distribution of distance and direction. The z-axis reports the frequency of obser-
vations across 5x5 independent sorts (each quarter) on the two herding measures. Hi(Lo) distance represents funds with very
dissimilar(similar) holdings. Hi(Lo) direction represents funds with very similar(dissimilar) trades.
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Table 3.5
Interaction of distance and direction
I regress distance at time t + n on direction over the t − 1 quarter. All regressions include time and benchmark indicator
variables, fund clusters, and controls. Control variables are fund performance percentile, flows as a percentage of assets,
turnover, expenses and log assets, all measured at t-1. Panel A distance and direction values calculated from the data. For
comparison, Panel B shows results using values calculated from the bootstrap simulation. I simulate portfolio evolution under
the null of (conditionally) independent trading. Specifically in each quarter I use actual beginning period portfolio weights and
draw weight changes from the empirical distribution [details in the Appendix]. I use these simulated portfolio weight changes
to calculate the resulting direction over the t − 1 quarter and the end of quarter distance.
distancet+1 distancet+2 distancet+3 distancet+4
Panel A: Actual
directiont−1 -0.00452*** -0.00533*** -0.00517*** -0.00502**
(-3.54) (-3.14) (-2.78) (-2.42)
distancet−1 0.918*** 0.885*** 0.862*** 0.844***
(100.12) (69.21) (62.23) (59.79)
Constant 0.0110** 0.0109* 0.0191*** 0.0146***
(2.33) (1.72) (3.47) (2.96)
Controls
√ √ √ √
Observations 13645 11380 10679 9923
R-squared 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.77
Panel B: Simulated Portfolios
directiont−1 0.0101* 0.00498 0.00742 0.0192**
(1.74) (0.71) (1.19) (2.25)
distancet−1 0.735*** 0.708*** 0.694*** 0.682***
(72.00) (55.07) (49.66) (46.39)
Constant 0.0733*** 0.0411*** 0.0477*** 0.0495***
(8.32) (7.60) (7.91) (9.77)
Controls
√ √ √ √
Observations 13645 11380 10679 9923
R-squared 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.56
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Table 3.6
Performance, Interaction of distance and direction
I repeat Fama MacBeth regressions of performance on direction and controls on subsamples. Columns 1 and 3 include funds
that are strongly trading towards the holdings of their peers and columns 2 and 4 use all others. Specifically I rank funds at
the end of each quarter on the change in distance (corrected for returns).
Carhart αt (quarterly) (bps) CPZ αt (quarterly) (bps)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
trading towards all trading towards all
peers’ holdings others peers’ holdings others
directiont−1 -271** -38* -318*** -50*
(-2.03) (-1.86) (-2.71) (-1.95)
fund aget−1 -1.2 2* -1.7 -0.1
(-0.77) (1.89) (-1.34) (-0.13)
expensest−1 5.9 -6 23.7 -48
(0.35) (-0.98) (1.38) (-0.09)
flows/assetst−1 65*** 58*** 65* 81***
(2.93) (3.87) (1.77) (5.93)
log(tna)t−1 -9.8** -7*** -7.8 -2.7
(-2.63) (-5.03) (-1.64) (-1.36)
turnovert−1 6.6 -5 11 3.6
(0.78) (-0.92) (0.74) (1.07)
Constant 38 21 24 -3.5
(1.33) (1.24) (0.59) (-0.39)
Observations 3257 13026 3257 13026
Number of groups 62 62 62 62
56
Table 3.7
Robustness, Characteristics of Herding Funds
This table reports coefficients from regressing one of a variety of measures of fund herding on lagged manager and fund
characteristics. The first three columns use herding measures computed within each benchmark group and columns 4-6 compute
measures across all funds. In column 1 the dependent variable is FHM as defined in Grinblatt et al. (1995) calculated for each
fund and quarter within each peer group. Column 2 uses FHM computed after defining all funds as peer funds. Column 3
uses directiontrd which is the direction measure calculated after setting all portfolio weight changes to zero if the fund did
not change the number of shares owned. Column 4 uses the standard direction measure but computed after defining all funds
as peer funds. All regressions include quarter and benchmark indicator variables. All independent variables are lagged and
obtained from CRSP. perf pctl is the relative performance of the fund over the previous quarter in percentile, where 1 is highest
fund return, 0 is lowest. mgr tenure is the length of time in years in which manager has been with the fund and fund age is
the time since inception, both in years. All regressions include year and benchmark indicator variables and standard errors are
clustered at the fund.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
FHM FHMallfunds directiontrd directionallfunds
mgr tenuret−1 -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0019*** -0.0016***
(-2.82) (-3.09) (-2.99) (-2.62)
fund aget−1 4.3e-05 0.0001** 0.0006 0.0007
(0.43) (2.03) (1.10) (1.26)
teamt−1 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0062** -0.0054*
(-0.95) (-1.02) (-2.12) (-1.88)
perf pctlt−1 0.0006 -0.0008** 0.0038 0.0030
(0.87) (-2.18) (1.38) (1.15)
flows/assetst−1 -0.0021 -0.0019** -0.0146** -0.0090
(-1.31) (-2.00) (-2.08) (-1.35)
turnovert−1 0.0095*** 0.0042*** 0.0064*** 0.0055***
(10.16) (8.13) (3.05) (2.82)
expensest−1 -4.2e-05 5.3e-05 -0.0147*** -0.0151***
(-0.05) (0.12) (-3.70) (-3.91)
log(tna)t−1 -6.5e-08 -2.0e-09 1.2e-06*** 1.2e-06***
(-1.32) (-0.09) (2.81) (2.63)
Observations 13405 13405 13399 13405
R-squared 0.25 0.31 0.17 0.18
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Table 3.8
Robustness, Performance of Herding Funds
For each fund and quarter I estimate factor loadings using the previous 5 years of monthly returns from CRSP (at least 2 years
required) and use these to compute the fund’s 4-factor Carhart alpha and 7-factor CPZ [Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2010)]
benchmark-based alpha. I results from Fama-MacBeth specification regressing the fund’s alpha (in bps) on lagged measures of
herding and log assets. I calculate direction and distance using 5 alternate definitions. Results on alternate distance definitions
are in Panel A, and direction in Panel B. The first row using the 4 quarter moving avg of the measures. The second row
uses ex-dividend returns to adjust portfolio weight changes for the passive effect of returns. The third row uses measures
after restricting stock-space to those stocks held by the fund at either the beginning or end of the quarter. The fourth row
value-weights peer funds to construct the herd vector. The fifth row reports results using dimensions defined by 48 industries
as determined by Fama and French (1997). Columns 1-5 use Carhart risk adjustment and columns 6-10 use Cremers et al.
risk adjustment. All specifications include control variables log assets, fund age, expenses, turnover, and fund flows. Standard
errors use Newey-West correction with maximum lags.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Carhart αt (quarterly) (bps) CPZ αt (quarterly) (bps)
Panel A: alternate measures of distance
distancet−1
mov avg. 286*** 247**
(2.98) (2.43)









√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 12996 16283 16283 16283 16277 12996 16283 16283 16283 16277
# groups 60 62 62 62 62 60 62 62 62 62
Panel B: alternate measures of direction
directiont−1
mov avg. -228*** -220***
(-3.16) (-4.38)









√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 12996 16283 16283 16283 16277 12996 16283 16283 16283 16277
# groups 60 62 62 62 62 60 62 62 62 62
58
Table 3.9
Descriptors of Leaders and Followers
This table reports coefficients from a Pooled OLS specification regressing measures of leading and following on lagged manager
and fund characteristics. The first three columns use leadert as the dependent variable and the last three columns use followert.
All regressions include year and benchmark effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund.
leadert followert









mgr tenuret−1 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0001 -4.8e-05 0.0004
(-0.70) (-0.90) (-1.22) (0.34) (-0.10) (0.62)
fund aget−1 0.0002 0.000 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.67) (0.06) (1.23) (-0.85) (-0.78) (-0.75)
perf pctlt−1 0.0053** 0.0038 0.0012 -0.0079*** -0.0102*** -0.0047
(2.20) (1.44) (0.36) (-3.30) (-3.43) (-1.32)
flows/assetst−1 0.0085* 0.0092 0.0113 0.0088* 0.0158*** 0.0096
(1.66) (1.63) (1.59) (1.84) (3.01) (1.39)
turnovert−1 0.0017* 0.002* 0.0004 -0.0045*** -0.0044*** -0.007***
(1.66) (1.69) (0.25) (-4.46) (-3.49) (-4.23)
expensest−1 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.002 -0.0007 -0.0022 0.003
(-0.07) (-0.06) (0.72) (-0.34) (-0.92) (0.87)
log(tna)t−1 1.7e-07 2.8e-07 -2.2e-07 -2.2e-07 -2.9e-07 -5.7e-07*
(0.44) (0.68) (-0.59) (-0.90) (-1.35) (-1.74)
Observations 10924 9143 5212 13231 9091 5887
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.13
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Table 3.10
Performance, Leaders and Followers
This table reports results from a Fama-MacBeth specification regressing the fund’s alpha on lagged measures of leader and
follower behavior and controls. For each fund and quarter I estimate factor loadings using the previous 5 years of monthly
returns from CRSP (at least 2 years required) and use these to compute the fund’s 4-factor Carhart alpha (in bps). Control
variables are fund age, expenses, turnover, fund flows, and log assets. Standard errors use Newey-West correction with maximum
lags.







fund aget−1 1.04 1.56*** 0.86
(1.59) (3.11) (1.48)
expensest−1 -5.95 -20.61*** -11.3
(-0.66) (-2.94) (-1.26)
flows/assetst−1 4.3 32 84.8***
(0.11) (1.61) (3.03)
log(tna)t−1 -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(-2.34) (-3.89) (-3.22)
turnovert−1 -10 6.3 -8.4
(-1.60) (1.07) (-1.54)
Constant -11.7 -12.8 -5
(-1.00) (-1.35) (-0.52)
Observations 10679 10683 12929
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Chapter 4
An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Herd
Behavior on Stock Liquidity∗
4.1 Introduction and Literature Review
A stock’s liquidity and the risks that may arise from potential illiquidity are important
factors for many investors in their investment decisions. Liquidity has been shown to not only
affect stock returns, but to also covary strongly across stocks, i.e. commonality in liquidity.1
This commonality in liquidity can arise from both supply-side and demand-side sources.
While studies have found support for supply-side sources (e.g., Coughenour and Saad, 2004;
Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton and Seasholes, 2010), other studies indicate
that supply-side sources cannot explain all of the observed commonality in liquidity (e.g.,
Brockman and Chung, 2002; Bauer, 2004).2 In this paper we propose that mutual funds
should be large contributors to the demand-side source of commonality in liquidity, the
rationale being that they are large investors with similar holdings and trading patterns who
∗This chapter is based on research conducted in “Commonality in Liquidity: A Demand-side Explanation”
co-authored with Stefan Ruenzi and Laura Starks.
1See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and (1989), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) Bren-
nan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000),Amihud (2002), Jones
(2002), Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2007), and Hasbrouck (2009) regarding liquidity and returns
and Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001),
Eckbo and Norli (2002) Brockman, Chung and Perignon (2007), Karolyi, Lee and vanDijk (2008) regarding
commonality in liquidity.
2These papers find strong commonality in liquidity in pure limit order markets, while the explanation
suggested in Coughenor and Saad (2004) is based on common market makers.
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are often hit with the same liquidity shocks.
The intuition for our argument is as follows: The trades of certain groups of investors
may exhibit similarity in both direction and timing. If a group of investors are subject to
similar liquidity shocks or changes in their information set, the trades of these investors will
likely be in the same direction (within a given stock) and occur with similar timing. If these
investors hold a large group of stocks, then the stocks comprising their holdings are likely
to experience large trade imbalances at the same points in time. It follows that stocks held
to a large extent by a group of investors that tend to trade in the same direction and at the
same time should be characterized by strong comovements in their liquidity.
Mutual funds are a prime example of an investor group that could give rise to such
an effect. Mutual funds typically hold large, well-diversified portfolios and regularly face liq-
uidity shocks in the form of positive or negative net-flows. The net-flows that mutual funds
experience are typically highly correlated across funds, i.e., if one fund faces outflows (in-
flows), many others face outflows (inflows) at the same time. Furthermore, previous research
has provided evidence of correlated trading by mutual funds as well as other institutional in-
vestors.3 Consequently, we hypothesize that stocks with high mutual fund ownership should
exhibit strong commonality in liquidity.
We test this basic hypothesis using an approach similar to that employed by Coughenour
and Saad (2004) in their examination of the role of market makers in explaining common-
ality. Using data on mutual fund ownership and measures of stock liquidity for NYSE and
3See, for example, Kraus and Stoll (1972), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman and
Wermers (1995), Sias and Starks (1997), Wermers (1999), Sias (2004), Coval and Stafford (2007), Greenwood
and Thesmar (2009), Anton and Polk (2010).
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AMEX stocks over the 1980 to 2008 period, we estimate the covariance between a stock’s
liquidity and the liquidity of a portfolio of stocks with high mutual fund ownership, where
we define liquidity by the Amihud (2002) measure of daily stock liquidity.4 For the sake of
brevity we label the regression coefficient on the high mutual fund ownership portfolio, HI,
the mutual fund liquidity beta.
Our hypothesis implies a positive relation between HI and mutual fund ownership.
To test this hypothesis, in each quarterly cross section we relate the stock’s commonality of
liquidity with the degree to which the stock is owned by mutual funds. We find that the
liquidity of stocks with high mutual fund ownership covaries about twice as strongly with
the liquidity of other high mutual fund ownership stocks than with the liquidity of stocks
with low mutual fund ownership.
An alternative explanation for our findings is that mutual funds hold stocks with
specific characteristics that explain commonality. That is, our results could be driven by
individual stock characteristics such as firm size or level of liquidity that might jointly deter-
mine systematic liquidity and mutual fund ownership.5 To test this alternative hypothesis,
we conduct several refinements of our analysis. We examine the relationship between mutual
fund ownership and the mutual fund liquidity beta within size and liquidity level quartiles.
The positive relationship between mutual fund ownership and the mutual fund liquidity
4We control for market-wide commonality in liquidity when estimating the covariance by including the
liquidity of the market portfolio in the time series regression. Coughenour and Saad (2004), in their analysis
of the impact of common market makers on commonality, use the liquidity of a portfolio of shares that
have the same market maker instead of the liquidity of a portfolio of high mutual fund ownership stocks as
explanatory variable.
5See, for example, Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias and
Starks, 2003; Massa and Phalippou, 2005.
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beta is strongest among large and liquid stocks, which tend to be the stocks most favored
by mutual funds. However, the result also generally holds within all subsets except for the
very smallest or most illiquid stocks, which is not surprising because mutual funds typically
are not the dominant holders (or traders) of these types of stocks. Further, we also find the
positive relation between mutual fund ownership and the mutual fund liquidity beta to con-
tinue to hold in a multivariate setting while controlling for the effects of a set of individual
stock characteristics and even after including firm-fixed effects.
If the impact of ownership on commonality is driven by the trading activity of mutual
funds, as we hypothesize, then one would expect the ownership-commonality relationship to
be stronger under conditions in which ownership is a better proxy for correlated trading. To
examine this, we consider the following two types of mutual fund trading: voluntary trad-
ing (often associated with information-based investment strategies) and involuntary trading
(typically caused by liquidity shocks from fund flows).
A mutual fund’s level of voluntary trading is reflected in the fund’s turnover ratio
after controlling for the fund’s flow-induced trading. If a high proportion of the mutual funds’
voluntary trading is due to correlations in information-based trading across funds, then we
would expect a relation between the level of such trading and commonality in liquidity.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that mutual fund liquidity betas are greater when
stocks are owned by mutual funds with high turnover ratios than for stocks that are owned
by mutual funds that do not trade a lot.
Involuntary or forced trading will be observed when mutual funds experience large
inflows or outflows. This creates buying or selling pressure for those shares typically owned
and traded by mutual funds (Coval and Stafford, 2007, Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl,
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2009, and Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim, 2009). Furthermore, one would expect a difference
between the effects of inflows and outflows as funds can accumulate cash before they have to
trade based on inflows, but outflows can force the fund to eventually trade in order to meet
redemptions (e.g., Edelen and Warther, 2001). We find strong evidence that suggests flow-
driven liquidity shocks are an important driver of the effects of the mutual fund ownership
results that we document. The impact of mutual fund ownership on a firm’s mutual fund
liquidity beta is about 50% greater in quarters with high absolute aggregate flows as com-
pared to quarters with low absolute aggregate flows. The effect is particularly pronounced for
negative flow quarters; the impact of ownership on commonality is roughly 75% stronger in
quarters with highly negative net flows. This evidence supports the hypothesis that liquidity
shocks that mutual funds face propagate through to the commonality in liquidity among the
stocks they hold. These results also support the notion that liquidity demand of mutual
funds contributes to commonality in liquidity.
Finally, in addition to using the level of ownership as a proxy for the likelihood of
correlated trading we use the change in mutual fund ownership obtained from quarterly SEC
filings. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a strong positive relation between changes
in a stock’s aggregate mutual fund ownership and its mutual fund liquidity beta.
Our results are stable over time, hold over different subsamples, and are not driven by
return or volatility comovements among stocks with high mutual fund ownership. Overall,
our results suggest an important role for mutual fund ownership and eventually liquidity
demand in explaining commonality in liquidity across stocks.
Our paper contributes to several main lines of research. It contributes to the broad
empirical literature on liquidity in common stocks. A number of papers have documented
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the impact of liquidity on expected returns.6 More recently, several studies document the
existence of commonality in liquidity, in the U.S. as well as internationally.7 Further the
relevance of commonality for asset pricing is highlighted in both theoretical and empirical
work.8 The literature focusing on commonality in liquidity has focused on the supply side
provision of liquidity. Coughenour and Saar (2004) show that commonality in liquidity
can arise from the same NYSE specialist providing liquidity for many stocks. Consistent
with this idea, Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010) provide
evidence that the aggregate inventory of all NYSE specialists is an important determinant
of aggregate market liquidity. We contribute to this strand of the literature by showing the
role of mutual funds in explaining commonality via the demand side.
The importance of the demand side of liquidity in explaining liquidity levels is pro-
vided by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) who find that aggregate order imbalance
- which is a measure for liquidity demand - reduces liquidity. However, their focus is on
liquidity levels, while our contribution is to show that liquidity demand has an impact on
commonality of liquidity. While generally focusing on liquidity supply, Hameed, Kang, and
Viswanathan (2010) also analyze the impact of correlated liquidity demand: consistent with
our results, they find that comovements in stock-level order imbalance measures help to
explain commonality. The impact of liquidity demanding trades on movements in market
prices is also examined in Hendershott and Seasholes (2009). We add to this literature by
6See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Jacoby,
Fowler and Gottesman (2000), Jones (2002), Amihud (2002), Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2007), and
Hasbrouck (2009).
7See, for example, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Brockman,
Chung and Perignon (2007), and Karolyi, Lee and vanDijk (2008).
8See, for example, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Sadka (2006), Korajczyk
and Sadka (2008), and Lee (2010).
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identifying a primary source of the comovements.
Our findings also contribute to the literature on the influence of investors, particularly
institutional investors, on stock returns.9 With regard to liquidity effects, Massa (2004)
and Massa Phalippou (2005) examine the relation between institutional investor ownership
and the level of stock liquidity. Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) examine the impact of
changing aggregate levels of institutional ownership on commonality in returns, finding that
commonality increases over time. Consistent with our results, they argue that this is driven
by the increasing importance of institutional investors over time. Further in terms of the
impact of investors’ correlated trading on returns, Greenwood (2009) shows that common
trading patterns of index investors can give rise to substantial excess comovement of stock
returns. Pirinsky and Wang (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2006) find that correlated trading
among institutional and retail investors, respectively, gives rise to return comovement.10
More closely related to our paper are Greenwood and Thesmar (2009) and Anton and
Polk (2010). Greenwood and Thesmar also use mutual fund ownership and mutual fund flows
to get a proxy for correlated trading. Examining the 1990 to 2008 period they show that
stocks owned by mutual funds with correlated inflows exhibit larger return comovements.
Anton and Polk provide evidence that common covariation in stocks is associated with
common ownership by mutual funds. We contribute to their findings by showing the channels
through which institutional investors can give rise to commonality in returns. In addition,
none of these papers investigates the link between correlated trading and comovement in
9See, for example, Sias and Starks, 1997; Gompers and Metricks, 2001; Sias, Starks and Titman, 2006.
10Evidence suggesting that investor clienteles might lead to return comovement is also provided in Barberis,
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005), Pirinsky and Wang (2006), and Green and Hwang (2009).
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liquidity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe
our data and the construction of our main variables. Our empirical analysis regarding
commonality in liquidity and mutual fund ownership is presented in Section 4.3 and in
Section 4.4 we consider proxies for mutual fund trading. We provide results from robustness
tests in Section 4.5 and our conclusions in Section 4.6.
4.2 Data and Variable Construction
Our initial sample is based on mutual fund holdings from the CDA/Spectrum database
over the 1980-2008 period.. We match the holdings of these mutual funds to other fund vari-
ables in the CRSP mutual fund database using MFLinks. We also match these data to
characteristics of the underlying stocks obtained from the CRSP stock database.
4.2.1 Variable Definitions
Ideally we would be able to directly observe mutual fund trades in order to measure
each stock’s degree of correlated mutual fund trading through time. Because we have quar-
terly snapshots of mutual fund ownership rather than trades, we create a stock-level proxy
for the likelihood of correlated trading based on the percentage of shares outstanding held
by mutual funds. Specifically, for each stock we construct a quarterly measure of aggregate
mutual fund ownership.11 The fraction of ownership mfowni,t, in stock i owned by J mutual
11To obtain quarterly stock level measures of aggregate mutual fund ownership using March, June, Septem-
ber, and December as quarter end dates we carry forward each fund’s quarterly holdings for two months.
Then, following the literature, we carry holdings forward an additional quarter if the fund appears to have
missed a report date (see, e.g., Frazzini and Lamont, 2008). This is done for a maximum of a 6 month
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where sharesownedi,j,t is the number of shares in stock i owned by mutual fund j at quarter
t and shrouti,t is the total number of shares outstanding. We use this variable as a proxy
for the likelihood that, for a given stock, large order imbalances will occur.
In our later analysis, we also consider a further measure of mutual fund trading and
use a turnover-weighted version of mfowni,t. When summing ownership across funds within
a stock, we weight ownership by turnover,
twmfowni,t =
∑J
j=1 turnoverj,t ∗ sharesownedi,j,t
shrouti,t
,
where turnoverj,t equals the turnover as reported in CRSP for fund J during quarter t.
We measure liquidity using the Amihud (2002) measure of daily stock illiquidity,
which equals the absolute value of return for stock i on day d divided by the dollar volume
of trading for stock i on day d. The Amihud measure is ideal for our research because it
is based on widely available data and can be calculated for a large number of stocks at a
daily frequency. Evidence also supports the use of the Amihud measure as a reliable proxy
for a stock’s liquidity with strong correlations between it and alternative liquidity measures
based on intraday microstructure measures (e.g., Hasbrouck (2005) and Koraczyk and Sadka
(2008).) More recently Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) show that the Amihud (2002)
measure is a good proxy for price impact.
gap in report dates. Holdings are adjusted for splits that occur between the reporting and filing dates.
We set holdings equal to zero if the report date is subsequent to the file date, if CRSP reports zero shares
outstanding, or if the total mutual fund ownership exceeds the shares outstanding.
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The Amihud (2002) measure comes into our analysis in two ways. First, we use the
quarterly average of the daily Amihud illiquidity measure as a control variable in many of the
regressions to take into account the potential impact of the level of stock liquidity. Second,
for our primary variable we employ the change in the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.
Specifically, we compute the change in the daily measure of stock illiquidity using volume















where ri, d is the return on stock i for day d and dvoli,d is the dollar volume for stock i on day
d.12 We calculate the daily change in stock illiquidity for all common stocks on the NYSE
and AMEX that are not penny stocks (i.e., price is above $2 per share), that trade on day d
and d-1, and that have at least 40 return observations in a quarter. To prevent outliers from
affecting our analysis, we eliminate the top and bottom 1% of observations of our measure.
4.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 reports statistics on the sample stocks’ market value, illiquidity measure,
mutual fund ownership, and mutual fund ownership weighted by fund turnover. The table
also reports statistics for aggregate quarterly mutual fund flows. Panel A shows the statistics
across all stocks and quarters for which we have data. The final sample consists of 120,413
stock-quarters with both mutual fund ownership data and sufficient data to calculate liquidity
12By taking the difference of the logs of Amihud’s illiquidity measure we follow Kamara, Lou, and Sadka
(2008). This is done to reduce effects of non-stationarity. However, in light of concerns of over-differencing,
we also replicate the main results using the difference in Amihud’s illiquidity measure from its five day
moving average (see Section 4.5).
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betas. Using the turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership reduces the sample to 66,598
stock-quarters because turnover data is only available beginning in 1999. The median firm
has $897 million in market equity and 10% of its shares are owned by mutual funds. The
mean turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership is slightly smaller than un-weighted mutual
fund ownership, reflecting a typical annual fund turnover ratio of less than one (in our sample
the average fund turnover is 0.83). In the last row we report summary statistics on aggregate
quarterly net-flows into or out of the equity mutual fund industry. Over our sample period
(1980-2008) mutual funds generally experience inflows, however aggregate flows are negative
in 17 of the quarters with the largest aggregate quarterly outflow equaling 3.05% of the
NYSE and AMEX market capitalization, compared to the largest aggregate quarterly inflow
of 2.83%.
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics by quartile of mutual fund owner-
ship. In each quarter we rank stocks by mfown and report means, standard deviations, and
medians of the selected variables. Typical stock size is about $3 billion in the lowest and
highest quartiles of mfown compared to $7 and $4 billion for the second and third quartiles
respectively. There is, however, a monotonic relationship between mutual fund ownership
and average liquidity; moving from the lowest to highest quartile of mfown, the illiq(avg)
drops from 0.19 to 0.04.
4.3 Commonality in Liquidity and Mutual Fund Ownership
In order to examine the extent to which mutual fund ownership determines comove-
ment in liquidity, we follow an approach similar to that in Coughenour and Saad (2004). In
the first step, we estimate how individual stock liquidity co-moves with the liquidity of a
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portfolio of high mutual fund ownership stocks after controlling for comovement with market
liquidity and additional variables (Section 4.3). In the second step we investigate whether
comovement between individual stocks and the high mfown portfolio is stronger among
firms with high mutual fund ownership (Section 4.3).
4.3.1 Estimating Liquidity Covariances
We first estimate for each firm-quarter the covariance between the daily changes in a
stock’s illiquidity and changes in the illiquidity of a portfolio of stocks with high mutual fund
ownership. We control for the widely documented comovement in individual illiquidity with
market illiquidity (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000). Thus, for each trading day in
the quarter we compute changes in the value-weighted illiquidity of two portfolios: a market
portfolio containing all stocks and a high mutual fund ownership portfolio comprised of the
stocks in the top quartile of mutual fund ownership as ranked at the end of the previous
quarter.13
For each firm, we run quarterly time series regressions of the firm’s daily change
in illiquidity, ∆illiqi,t, on changes in the high mutual fund ownership portfolios’ illiquidity,
∆illiqmfown,t, and changes in the market illiquidity, ∆illiqmkt,t, as well as control variables:
∆illiqi,t = α + βHI∆illiqmfown,t + βmkt∆illiqmkt,t + δcontrols + εi,t, (4.1)
We focus on changes, or to be precise changes in logs, because we want to inves-
tigate the similarity in movements in liquidity. Furthermore, this approach helps to avoid
13Results using equal-weighted portfolios are very similar (see Section 4.5).
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econometric problems due to the potential nonstationarity of the liquidity measure. For each
regression, the firm of interest is removed from the market portfolio as well as the high mutual
fund ownership portfolio (when applicable). We follow the approach taken by Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam (2000) and include lead, lag and contemporaneous market returns, con-
temporaneous firm return squared, and lead and lag changes in the two portfolio illiquidity
measures. The latter controls are designed to capture lagged adjustments in liquidiity, while
the market returns are included to control for possible correlations between returns and our
illiquidity measure. The squared stock returns are included to capture volatility which might
be related to liquidity. We require a minimum of 40 observations for each firm-quarter.14
We show later in robustness tests (Section 4.5) that this particular specification of the first
stage time series regressions is not crucial to our main results.
Table 4.2 presents sample statistics on the market and high mutual fund ownership
portfolios used in the time series regressions as well as coefficients of interest from the re-
gressions. In Panel A we report summaries for representative quarters, one each from the
beginning (1980), the middle (1995) and the end (2008) of our sample. In Panel B we
summarize by 5 year periods as well as the full sample.
The left-hand side of each panel reports the average of the mutual fund liquidity
beta coefficients across all firms in that quarter, the percentage of beta coefficients that are
positive and the percentage that are significant as well as a t-statistic on the sample of beta
coefficients in that quarter. The table also reports the number of stocks in the portfolio and
the average firm size and illiquidity.
14Results are very similar if instead of requiring a minimum of 40 observations we require a minimum of
30 or 50 observations.
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Relatively few of the beta estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5%-level
based on two-sided t-tests. This is likely due to the large noise in the firm level regressions,
which are conducted on a quarterly basis.15 While few of the individual quarterly estimates
are statistically significant, the mean of the distribution of estimates is different from zero
with a high degree of significance as indicated by the t-statistic on the sample of estimates.
The right-hand side of the table summarizes the same variables for the market liquidity
beta coefficients. Overall, the positive average and the similar magnitude of the two beta
coefficients, βHI and βmkt, clearly shows that individual stock liquidity on average co-moves
positively with both the liquidity of the market portfolio as well as the liquidity of a high
mutual fund ownership portfolio. However, in the next section we test our main hypothesis:
that βHI is higher among stocks with high mutual fund ownership.
The bottom panel summarizes the time series regression output by 5 year periods.
We calculate summary variables and t-statistics for each quarter as above, and in this panel
we report averages of these quarterly summary variables. For example, in the 1980-1985
period the typical quarter has a mean βHI equal to 0.26 and the average t-statistic on each
quarter’s sample of estimates is 5.10.
The average size of firms in the high mutual fund ownership portfolio is smaller than
the average size of the firms in the market portfolio. Average mutual fund ownership over
the entire sample of stocks is increasing through time. The average mutual fund ownership
in a stock is 4% in 1980 and this number increases to 24% in the third quarter of 2008.
15In unreported tests, using the full available time series for each stock we find that 71% of the market
liquidity betas and 77% of mutual fund liquidity betas are positive, with 24% and 28% significantly different
from zero at the 5% level, respectively.
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Among the stocks in the top quartile of mutual fund ownership, average ownership increases
from 9% in 1980 to 37% in 2008. Stocks were less liquid in the 1980’s relative to the later
period. This finding is consistent with the results in Jones (2002). The decrease in illiquidity
is most pronounced among the stocks in the highest quartile of mutual fund ownership. The
average illiquidity among the stocks in this portfolio is lower than the average illiquidity of
the stocks in the market portfolio in all quarters. This result shows that mutual funds prefer
liquid stocks, which is also similar to results from earlier studies (e.g., Falkenstein, 1996).
4.3.2 Mutual Fund Ownership and Commonality
Our central hypothesis is that the liquidity of stocks with high levels of mutual fund
ownership will covary strongly with other stocks also owned to a high degree by mutual
funds. Table 4.3 provides results from a first set of tests of our central hypothesis using one
dimensional and dependent sorts based on quarterly rankings of mutual fund ownership. In
this and all future tests, β + HI and βmkt are estimated over quarter t, while mutual fund
ownership is measured at the end of quarter t − 1.
Panel A shows that the average βHI is monotonically increasing in mutual fund own-
ership as predicted by the hypothesis. The lowest ownership quartile has an average Panel
A shows that the average βHI is monotonically increasing in mutual fund ownership as pre-
dicted by the hypothesis. The lowest ownership quartile has an average HI of 0.20 compared
to 0.40 for the highest quartile. The difference is economically and statistically significant,
providing evidence that the liquidity of stocks owned to a high degree by mutual funds
strongly covary together. These findings provide first evidence for our central hypothesis.
The results for βHI can be contrasted with those for βmkt reported on the right hand
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side of Panel A. There is no significant difference between the comovement of stocks’ liquidity
with the overall market liquidity in the highest and lowest mutual fund ownership quartiles.
We also report averages for βHI and βmkt from sorts based on firm size and liquidity.
For βHI , the difference between the top and bottom quartiles is statistically significant in
both cases. Large stocks have a significantly higher average βHI of 0.29 compared to 0.23
among the smallest quartile. However, the relationship is non-monotonic. We find a similar
non-monotonic relationship between average illiquidity and βHI . There are also strongly
significant differences between the comovement of a stock’s liquidity with the market liquidity
in the highest and lowest size and illiquidity, respectively, quartiles. Our results show that
large and liquid stocks co-move more heavily with both market as well high mutual fund
ownership portfolio liquidity as compared to small and illiquid stocks.
The results presented thus far are univariate in nature. However mutual funds do not
randomly select stocks but have preferences for certain characteristics. Most importantly,
in aggregate they prefer large and liquid stocks (see, e.g., Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein,
1996). Our previous results suggest that these characteristics are also related to βHI . Thus,
in Panel B of Table 4.4 we provide the results on the average liquidity betas for double sorts
based on these variables and mutual fund ownership. The sorting is first done on size or
illiquidity and then on mutual fund ownership. The results show that the positive relation
between HI and mutual fund ownership is robust to subsets by firm size and illiquidity.
In all cases the average βHI is increasing in mutual fund ownership although the effect is
insignificant among the most illiquid stocks. The latter are the stocks that are least held by
mutual funds, which we expect would not be much affected by correlated mutual fund stock
trading.
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In a second test of our central hypothesis we control for stock characteristics in a mul-
tivariate regression. We regress βHI against the previous quarter’s mutual fund ownership,
controlling for firm size and average illiquidity. We include time dummies and cluster the
standard errors at the firm level. This accounts for time series and cross sectional dependence
as long as the time effect is fixed (Petersen (2009)). The specification is
βHI = a + b1mfowni,t−1 + b2ln(sizei,t−1) + b3illiq(avg)i,t−1 + timedummmies + εi,t. (4.2)
Our main hypothesis predicts b1¿0. We do not have clear theoretical predictions on b2
or b3. However, given the results from Table 4.3, one might expect a positive relation between
βHI and firm size and a negative relation with illiquidity. The results of this regression are
presented in Panel A of Table 4.4. The first column of the table shows the results for the full
sample for the regression of βHI against mutual fund ownership and time dummies only. We
affirm that stocks with high mutual fund ownership exhibit strong comovement, evidenced by
the significant coefficient estimate of 0.896. As this regression includes time fixed effects, the
higher βHI should not be caused by a possible common time trend in mutual fund ownership
levels and liquidity comovements.
In Model (2) we control for the stock’s size and average liquidity. Again the coefficient
on mutual fund ownership is positive and highly significant, and is similar in magnitude to
the coefficient estimated in the absence of controls. The result is also economically significant
- a one standard deviation increase (0.10) in mutual fund ownership is associated with a 0.08
increase in HI, which equates to a 27% increase from its mean.
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4.3.3 Potential Alternative Explanations and Specifications
Another possible explanation for our results is that mutual fund managers have pref-
erences for a stock characteristic (other than size and liquidity) that is correlated with βHI .
Although it is not clear what the source of the unobserved heterogeneity and correlation
might be, in Model (3) we include firm fixed effects to address this concern. We continue to
include time dummies and cluster standard errors at the firm level. The results show that
time invariant unobservable heterogeneity is not driving our results.
The last two models in Table 4.4 use corrections for different assumptions on the
structure of the error term. Model (4) employs standard errors with two dimensional clus-
tering, and Model (5) uses a Fama-MacBeth specification. In both alternative models we find
a positive relationship between the mutual fund liquidity beta and mutual fund ownership
that is both economically and statistically significant.
We have no direct prediction on the functional form of the relationship between
ownership and commonality, and so for further robustness we repeat our tests using an
indicator variable for high mutual fund ownership rather than a continuous variable. We
replace mfowni,t−1 in (2) by mfown(dummy)i,t−1, which is equal to one if mutual fund
ownership is in the top quartile in quarter t−1, and zero otherwise. These results are reported
in Panel B of Table 4.4. The use of this variable provides a natural economic interpretation.
From column 2 in Panel B, stocks in the highest mutual fund ownership quartile have a βHI
in the next quarter that is 0.12 higher than those outside the top quartile. This is a large
economic effect given the unconditional mean βHI of 0.31. The coefficient on this dummy
variable is positive and statistically significant in all other specifications as well.
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The sorts in Table 4.3 indicate a possible non-linear relation between βHI and firm
size or illiquidity. Thus, we rerun our primary multivariate specification (quarter fixed
effects and firm clusters) for samples divided by size quartiles, additionally controlling for
size and liquidity within each subsample. We also conduct this test for subsamples divided
by liquidity, time (5 year subperiods), and whether the quarter has an up or down market
return. Table 4.5 reports these results again for a linear impact of mfown (Panels A and
B) as well as for the impact of the high mutual fund ownership dummy (Panels C and D).
In Panels A and C, the first four columns split the sample into size quartiles (ranked
quarterly) and show that a significantly positive relation between βHI and mutual fund
ownership exists in all but one of the subsamples, the quartile of stocks with the smallest
market capitalization. The next four columns report the results from the sample divided
into liquidity quartiles and show a significantly positive relationship between βHI and mutual
fund ownership in all but the most illiquid stocks. This result is consistent with our results
using dependent sorts in Panel B of Table 4.3.
When we divide our sample into approximate 5-year subsamples from 1980 to 2008
(with the last subperiod containing almost 8 years), we find that the effect exists in all
subperiods, but the magnitude of the coefficient for the relation between βHI and mutual
fund ownership varies over time.
Motivated by results of magnified liquidity effects in down markets in Chordia, Roll
and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010), we also look at
subsamples of up as well as down market quarters. We find a strong effect in both cases.
The coefficient on mfown is larger in quarters with negative market returns. However, the
difference between the coefficients in the up versus down market subsamples is not significant.
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This shows that although previous research documents higher commonality in liquidity in
down markets, up versus down markets have no impact on the role of mutual fund ownership
in explaining liquidity. Rather, results are fairly stable across market regimes.16
Overall, these results provide solid evidence that the liquidity of stocks with high mu-
tual fund ownership strongly co-move. The effect is robust to various assumptions regarding
unobserved heterogeneity, independence of observations, and functional form, as well as a
variety of subsamples.
4.4 Commonality in Liquidity and Mutual Fund Trading
In the previous section we provide evidence that commonality in a stock’s liquidity is
strongly associated with the level of mutual fund ownership in the stock. We claim that this
relationship exists because mutual fund ownership proxies for the likelihood that trading will
be correlated. That is, it is not the level of ownership that matters per se, but the extent
to which it reflects future correlated trading. In the following section we test alternative
proxies for the probability of future correlated trading.
In the absence of directly observing trades, an ideal proxy would reflect two probabil-
ities, i) the likelihood that a stock is traded and ii) conditional on being traded the likelihood
that the trades are in the same direction. We refine mfowni,t in three ways to capture the
likelihood of future correlated trading; a measure that reflects correlated voluntary trading,
one that reflects correlated forced trading, and one that reflects overall correlated trading.
16In unreported results we examine differences between the levels of market-wide commonality in up and
down markets and confirm the results of Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Hameed, Kang, and
Viswanathan (2010) in our sample.
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The first proxy allows for differential trading among mutual funds by incorporating
the fund’s turnover ratio into the ownership measure. That is, we treat ownership by high
turnover funds as a better proxy for the likelihood of correlated trading than the same level
of ownership by funds with low turnover. Because the turnover ratio as reported in CRSP is
corrected for trading due to flows, it reflects voluntary trading. However, voluntary trading
could reflect trading by mutual funds providing liquidity to other market participants as well
as their information-based liquidity demanding trades (Da, Gao, and Jagannathan, 2008).
While both cases could explain commonality, only the latter would be consistent with mu-
tual funds demanding liquidity and eventually giving rise to commonality via this channel.
Thus, to investigate whether the mutual fund demand side channel plays an important role
in commonality of liquidity, we include a measure of future correlated trading designed to
capture the effects of liquidity shocks to the fund itself due to inflows or outflows. There-
fore our second refinement is to condition mutual fund ownership on aggregate fund flows.
Because flows can lead to buying or selling pressure of mutual funds, i.e. liquidity demand,
if commonality among mutual fund owned stocks is higher in periods of high absolute flows
(and particularly in periods of high outflows), this is a clear indication that mutual funds
have an impact on commonality via their liquidity demand.
Our final refinement is to use changes rather than levels of ownership. The change in
ownership reflects actual trades in the same direction, thus capturing both the probability
a stock is traded and the probability that trades are in the same direction. Therefore
it should not be surprising that the change in ownership - at atomistic granularity - is
the ideal measure. However data availability limits us to quarterly changes. Thus, using
changes presents the tradeoff of measuring some fraction of trading with certainty, but also
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underestimating the amount of actual trading.
4.4.1 Mutual Fund Turnover
As a first approach to better capture the probability of correlated trading, we in-
corporate mutual funds’ turnover ratios. When summing ownership across funds within a
stock, we weight mutual fund ownership by the holding fund’s turnover, turnover-weighted
mutual fund ownership, twmfowni,t as defined in Section 4.2.
We expect to find that the turnover-weighted measure, to the extent that it is a better
proxy for correlated demand in liquidity, is more strongly associated with high commonality
in liquidity than an unconditional measure of mutual fund ownership.17 One drawback of this
refinement is data limitation because CRSP does not report fund turnover prior to 1999. The
results are reported in Table 4.6. The first model includes twmfown only. For comparison,
the second column repeats the evaluation of our baseline model using mfown as the primary
independent variable for the limited sample 1999 to 2008. It should be noted that the results
for mfown in this restricted time period are consistent with the results for the full sample
period reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The model reported in the third column includes both
twmfown and mfown.18 The coefficient on the turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership
variable is strongly significant in all three models irrespective of whether un-weighted mutual
fund ownership is included.
17Importantly, this would not be case if there exists a negative relationship between correlated trading
and fund turnover strong enough to outweigh the high levels of trading reflected by high fund turnover.
18The correlation between mfown and twmfown is 0.78, which might hint at multicollinearity in the model
including both variables. However, the significant impact of twmfown we find as well as the relatively low
variance inflation factors of 3.68 and 2.97 for mfown and twmfown, respectively, clearly indicate that this is
not a concern here.
82
The summary statistics reported in Table 4.1 show sufficient similarity in the means
and standard deviations of the weighted and unweighted mutual fund ownership measures,
which suggests that we can roughly compare the coefficients of the two measures. Such
a comparison shows that the coefficient for the turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership
measure in column 3 is 1.152, which is clearly larger than the coefficient for the unweighted
mutual fund ownership, which is 0.185 and not statistically distinguishable from zero. To
provide a more precise comparison in the last three models of the table we use standard-
ized independent variables. Again the results indicate that ownership by mutual funds with
greater portfolio turnover is associated with higher commonality in liquidity than simply
ownership by mutual funds in general. Further, Column 6 shows that a one standard de-
viation increase in twmfown is associated with a 0.09 increase in βHI . Thus, consistent
with our hypothesis, stocks held by mutual funds that trade more frequently have stronger
commonality in their liquidity.
Voluntary trading is often information-based trading. Thus, the strong impact of
voluntary mutual fund trading on commonality suggests that the trading of individual mutual
funds does not cancel out. This is consistent with the view that mutual funds tend to trade
on the same information in the same direction, which eventually leads to correlated liquidity
demand and thus commonality in liquidity.
An alternative story to explain these results is that voluntary trading is not infor-
mation driven (and thus a sign of liquidity demand), but that mutual funds also act as
liquidity suppliers in some cases. Thus, in the following section we focus on the impact of
liquidity shocks mutual funds face themselves. This will allow us to isolate cases in which
any potential effect most likely works via a demand-side channel.
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4.4.2 Aggregate Fund Flows
In the previous section we investigate the relation between βHI and a proxy for vol-
untary mutual fund trading. In this section we estimate the relation between βHI and
involuntary correlated trading. Thus, we infer differences in trading intensities using fund
flows.19 According to our hypothesis, the impact of mutual fund ownership should be greater
in periods with high absolute flows. This effect should be particularly strong for outflows as
suggested by the results of Coval and Stafford (2007). The reason why we expect a stronger
impact of outflows is that inflows can be more easily spread across stocks, but fund outflows,
if met through stock sales, must be met by selling the stocks currently held by the mutual
funds.20
To examine the impact of flow levels, in each quarter we aggregate fund flows to
compute a net dollar flow into or out of equity mutual funds. We then scale this amount
by the dollar value of the total market at the beginning of the quarter. From the flow data
we calculate four dummy variables; negnetflow equals one if aggregate flows are negative,
and zero otherwise, and hiabsflow equals one if aggregate flows in a quarter are in the top
or bottom 10% of all quarters, and zero otherwise. Net flows are signed, so the bottom
(top) 10% is comprised of the largest net outflow (inflow) quarters. We also aggregate
inflows and outflows separately in each quarter. Then we set hioutflow (hiinflow) equal to
19Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2009) find that fund flows can explain much of the increased turnover
in equity markets over recent years. Furthermore, mutual funds tend to scale up their existing holdings if
they face inflows of new money (Pollet and Wilson, 2008), i.e. inflows should lead to liquidity demand for
those stocks with high previous mutual fund ownership.
20That high negative mutual fund flows lead to correlated liquidity demand is also suggested by the findings
of Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) who document a negative relation between commonality in order
imbalances and aggregate net fund flows.
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one for the top 25% of quarters measured by outflows (inflows) scaled by market cap, and
zero otherwise. Each of these dummy variables is interacted with mfown in the previously
described regression specifications used in Table 4.4. We continue to use time dummies to
pick up general increases or decreases in systematic liquidity during periods of extreme flows.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 4.7. The results of Model 1
show that the impact of ownership on commonality is much stronger during periods of high
positive or negative net flows. Specifically, the coefficient on mfown is 0.765 in 80% of the
quarters compared to 0.765 + 0.395 = 1.160 in the top and bottom 10% of flows (strong
inflows and outflows). The results of the alternative specifications reported in Columns 2, 3
and 4 are similar. In column 2 the relation between βHI and mfown is 0.575 larger when
the mutual fund industry experiences net outflows relative to the quarters with net inflows.
This effect is highly significant both economically and statistically. Columns 3 and 4 show
that we find similar results when aggregating inflows and outflows separately in each quarter.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that fund flows lead to correlated liquidity
demand by mutual funds and that this effect is more pronounced for outflows. These results
are also consistent with those of Coval and Stafford (2007) regarding mutual fund fire sales.
Columns 5 through 8 show the results from our base regression (2) within subsamples
of quarters split by the level of aggregate funds flows. The strong relation between common-
ality in liquidity and mutual fund ownership holds in each of the subsamples. There is some
evidence of a U-shaped relationship between the magnitude of liquidity commonality and ag-
gregate net flows, as would be expected if mutual fund ownership has a larger impact during
periods of extreme flows. However, consistent with results from the interactions in columns
2 through 4, this seems primarily driven by negative flow quarters. In Panel B of Table 4.7
85
we test specifically for a U-shaped conditional relationship. First, we run 114 quarterly cross
sectional regressions based on model (2), regressing commonality on ownership and controls.
Then we use the time series of coefficients on mfown as the dependent variable in a regres-
sion with aggregate net flows and squared aggregate net flows as independent variables. We
find that the impact of ownership on commonality is strongest in periods of high inflows and
outflows as evidenced by the positive coefficient on aggregate flows squared, and that the
effect of outflows dominates the effect of inflows, as evidenced by the negative coefficient on
aggregate flows.
Overall, the findings from this section show that, in addition to voluntary information-
based trading, flow induced liquidity demanding trades give rise to commonality in liquidity.
4.4.3 Changes in Mutual Fund Ownership
Finally we use actual changes in mutual fund ownership of individual stocks through
the holdings data. Specifically we compute the absolute value of the change in mfowni from
t−1 to t, and denote this variable |∆mfowni,t|. The change in ownership reflects an amount
of trading that we can be certain took place, and that these trades were in the same direction.
We are limited by data availability to compute changes on a quarterly basis. Therefore while
changes in ownership reflect with certainty some amount of correlated trading, an important
drawback is that this captures only the lower bound.
We measure the change contemporaneously with the estimation of βHI to determine
whether higher sensitivity to aggregate mutual fund liquidity occurs in the same period as
greater mutual fund trading, which would be consistent with correlated trading by mutual
funds contributing to commonality in liquidity. We employ the following specification for
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this test:
βHI = a + b1|∆mfowni,t|+ b2ln(sizei,t−1) + b3illiq(avg)i,t−1 + timedummmies + εi,t. (4.3)
A positive and significant b1 would support our hypothesis.
The results of this regression are provided in Table 4.8. We use the absolute value of
the change in mfown in the first model, and a dummy variable equal to one if the absolute
change is in the top quartile that quarter, and zero otherwise, in the second model. In
both cases the coefficient on the change measure is positive and significant at the 1% level,
consistent with our hypothesis that mutual fund trading in a stock as reflected by changes
in a stock’s mutual fund ownership increases systematic liquidity.
Overall, the results of Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 clearly support our hypothesis that the
relation between commonality in liquidity and mutual fund ownership is due to correlations
in the trading by mutual funds.
4.5 Robustness Tests
Thus far, we have shown that the relationship between βHI and mfown is robust to
different specifications regarding functional form and structure of the error term. We find
additional support for our hypothesis through several refinements of our main variable of
interest, turnover-weighted mfown, mfown conditional on flows, and changes in mfown.
In this section we address concerns arising from our first stage estimate of common liquidity,
and in particular our use of the Amihud illiquidity ratio as the measure of liquidity. For
example, the commonality that we document may be driven by common (absolute) returns,
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not necessarily common movements in the ratio of returns to volume. In this section we first
demonstrate that our results are not driven by common returns or common volatility, and
then show that our results are not specific to the structure or our first stage estimation.
We address a potential impact of common returns and common volatility in three
ways. First, we add beta estimates between the firm return and the value-weighted return of
the high mutual fund ownership portfolio (estimated contemporaneously with the liquidity
beta) as an additional control variable in our base regression equation (2). We call this
variable mutual fund return beta. Adding that variable controls for the impact of common
information – that has a joint impact on the returns of the stocks with high mutual fund
ownership - on the comovements in liquidity. Results are presented in the first column of
Panel A in Table 4.9. Regarding the new control variable, we find a significantly positive
impact of the mutual fund return beta on βHI . This shows that common return effects (as
a proxy for information affecting the returns of high mutual fund ownership stocks) also has
an impact on commonality in liquidity among these stocks. More importantly, the positive
impact of mutual fund ownership on βHI still remains highly significant and is only slightly
reduced after inclusion of the mutual fund return beta as compared to the results reported in
Table 4.4. Second, to capture any potential non-linear relationship between βHI and return
comovements, we run our base regression (2) on subsamples based on mutual fund return
beta quartiles. Results reported in columns 2 through 5 show that our main finding holds in
all subsamples as indicated by a highly significant positive estimate for the impact of mfown
on βHI in each case. Third, we modify the first stage regression (1) in order to capture the
impact of a potential comovement between individual stock liquidity and the return of the
portfolio of high mutual fund ownership stocks. Thus, we include the return of a portfolio
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of high mutual fund ownership stocks as additional control variable in (1). Results from
equation (2) using the βHI from this modified first stage model as dependent variable are
presented in column 6 in Panel A of Table 4.9.21 We still find a highly significant positive
impact of mfown on βHI .
One may also be concerned that our results are driven by comovements in volatility
among stocks with high mutual fund ownership which might be caused by joint changes in
the riskiness of the funds owned by mutual funds. To address this we conduct the same
battery of tests as above, but now replace the return by the return squared (for both the
individual stock and the high mutual fund ownership portfolio), i.e. we use squared returns
as volatility proxy. Results in Panel B of Table 4.9 show that our earlier results hold: the
positive relationship between mfown and βHI is highly significant also after controlling for
comovements in volatility (mutual fund return2 beta; columns 7 through 11). Adding the
squared return of the high mutual fund ownership portfolio in the first stage regression
(to control for the impact of the comovement of individual liquidity and high mutual fund
ownership portfolio volatility) does also not change the results obtained from the standard
second stage regression (column 12).
Finally, we repeat our whole analysis using turnover instead of the Amihud illiquidity
ratio as an alternative liquidity measure.22 Results are presented in the first column of
Table 4.10. There continues to be a strong positive relationship between ownership and
commonality using the alternative liquidity proxy.
21We find similar results if we include market returns instead of or additionally in model (1).
22We use the Amihud measure in our main examination, because stock turnover is only a weak proxy
for liquidity and is also mechanically related to our measure of turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership,
because trading of mutual funds is directly linked to turnover on the stock level.
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Overall, these findings show that our previous results are not driven by return or
volatility comovements among stocks with high mutual fund ownership or any other me-
chanical effect which might arise due to the definition of the Amihud liquidity measure.
In the remainder of this section we now show that our results are also not dependent on
the specification of the first stage liquidity covariance estimation procedure. We re-estimate
βHI in a variety of ways and report the results of second-stage tests of our main hypothesis
[equation (2)] using the variety of first-stage βHI estimates. These results are reported in
columns 2 through 9 of Table 4.10. In the first approach, instead of using value-weighted
portfolio liquidity to determine βHI , we regress the individual stock liquidity measure on
equal-weighted market and high mutual fund ownership portfolio liquidity after including
the standard controls. Consistent with our results using value weighted portfolio liquidity, we
find a very strong positive relation between the high mutual fund liquidity beta and mutual
fund ownership. In this case, the coefficient is more than twice as large as the coefficient
using value-weighted portfolio liquidity (2.063 in Table 4.10, column 2, compared to 0.836
in column 2 of Table 4.9). In the second approach, we employ our standard time series
estimation procedure (model 1) but now follow Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)
and also use sum betas in the second stage, which equal βHI plus the betas on the lead
and lag values of the high mutual fund ownership (and similarly for the market beta). The
results, reported in column 3 of Table 4.10, are consistent with our previous results. Next,
the liquidity of stocks belonging to the same industry would be expected to comove more
strongly with each other than with stocks not in the industry. Thus, in our third approach, we
include industry-level measures in the first stage liquidity covariance estimation in two ways.
The results reported in the fourth and fifth column of Table 4.10 use a βHI estimated after
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controlling for the covariation between the firm’s liquidity and that of a portfolio of stocks
in its industry (identified by two-digit SIC code). In column 4 we use βHI on the typical
high mfown portfolio, but we also control for liquidity covariation with stocks in the same
industry by including lead, lag, and contemporaneous changes in the value-weighted industry
portfolio liquidity. In column 5, we use a similar βHI but additionally add the lead, lag, and
contemporaneous return of the value weighted industry portfolio. In both cases, our measure
of commonality in liquidity in high mutual fund ownership stocks, βHI , has a positive and
significant relationship with mfown. In columns 6 and 7 we use only one liquidity portfolio
in the time series estimation. First, we remove the high mutual fund ownership portfolio
(and its returns) and estimate a covariance with only the market portfolio. In column 7 we
do the same using only a high mutual fund ownership portfolio. Not surprisingly, we find a
positive relationship in the second stage between mfown and βmkt, and a positive but much
stronger relationship between mfown and βHI . In column 8 we revert to the standard first
stage portfolios and control variables used in the earlier tables. However, we now employ
a different liquidity calculation to address the concern that changes in illiquidity might be
over-differenced. Thus, as suggested by Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and
Seasholes (2009), we use a quasi-differencing method. Instead of using differences in logs of
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio we use the difference from a 5 day moving average. We find results
that are similar to those from our main specification.
Finally we generate a portfolio of randomly selected stocks and include it instead of
the portfolio of high mutual fund ownership stocks. Specifically, we randomly choose 25%
of the stocks in each quarter and compute a value-weighted change in daily liquidity for
this portfolio (and its returns). We then use liquidity betas on this portfolio as independent
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variable in our regression models. As expected, results in column 9 show that the liquidity
beta on randomly selected stocks’ liquidity in this placebo regression is not at all related to
mutual fund ownership.
4.6 Conclusion
We hypothesize that correlated trading among investors in a stock is an important
explanation for commonality in liquidity across stocks. Using data on mutual fund owner-
ship and stock liquidity from NYSE and AMEX stocks for the period 1980 to 2008, we find
evidence that suggests mutual funds are an important factor in explaining commonality in
liquidity. We use a two-step process similar to the one suggested in Coughenour and Saad
(2004) by first regressing a stock’s liquidity on the liquidity of two portfolios: a market port-
folio and a portfolio consisting of stocks with high mutual fund ownership. This regression
results in two liquidity betas: a high mutual fund ownership portfolio liquidity beta and a
market portfolio liquidity beta. In the second step, we examine the relation between the high
mutual fund ownership liquidity beta and the extent to which a stock is owned by mutual
funds. We find that mutual fund liquidity betas are about twice as large for stocks with high
mutual fund ownership as for those with low mutual fund ownership. We also find that this
result is not driven by time trends in commonality and mutual fund ownership or by stock
characteristics such as firm size, liquidity levels, or other unobservable stock characteristics
that might jointly determine systematic liquidity and mutual fund ownership.
We also expect the relation between commonality in liquidity and mutual fund own-
ership to be stronger in circumstances with greater mutual fund trading and our results
support that hypothesis. We find that the commonality in liquidity is stronger in stocks
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that are owned by mutual funds with high turnover ratios. We also find that the common-
ality is greater during periods of negative or extreme aggregate mutual fund flows. Further,
we find a strong positive relation between changes in aggregate mutual fund ownership and
a stock’s mutual fund liquidity beta.
Overall our results suggest that – in addition to the supply-side explanations for com-
monality in liquidity found in earlier studies (e.g., Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Comerton-
Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton and Seasholes, 2010) – demand-side factors, i.e., mutual
fund ownership and particularly flow-induced trading, are important explanations as well.
Thus, liquidity risk arises not only from the actions of market specialists, but also the in-
vestors in the stock. These results suggest that mutual fund trading may add to the risk
of a stock, consistent with the findings of Sias (1996) that institutional investors contribute
to a stock’s volatility. Mutual fund managers might consider avoiding stocks with higher
systematic liquidity risk, i.e., stocks whose ownership is dominated by other mutual funds,
particularly if they are concerned about the effects of liquidity shocks hitting themselves in
the form of investor flows. However, our results also suggest that this - at least in aggregate
- is not possible, because mutual funds themselves give rise to much of the commonality in
liquidity we observe.
In this paper we have selected mutual funds as a group of investors to examine
for correlated trading and resulting commonality. Of course, this does not preclude the
possibility that the correlated trading of investors such as hedge funds or other institutional




This table reports summary statistics for select variables. Panel A reports statistics for the full sample of stock-quarters over
the 1980-2008 period. mfown is the number of shares owned by mutual funds scaled by shares outstanding. firm size is the
market value of the stock at the end of the quarter. illiq(avg) is the average over the quarter of the absolute value return scaled
by dollar volume (in millions). twmfown is the total shares owned by mutual funds weighted by each fund’s turnover, scaled
by shares outstanding. Aggregate flows are the net dollar flows to or from all mutual funds in a quarter scaled by beginning
of quarter total market value. Panel B reports means, standard deviations, and medians for subsamples of firms by mfown
quartile ranked quarterly.
Panel A: Full Sample N Mean Std Dev Min Max Median
firm size (millions) 120,413 4270 16052 2 571197 897
illiq(avg) 120,413 0.08 0.3 < 0.001 215.74 0.008
mfown 120,413 0.13 0.1 0 0.88 0.10
twmfown 66,598 0.10 0.08 0 0.78 0.08
aggregate flows (% of mkt cap) 114 0.65% 0.73% -3.05% 2.83% 0.65%
mfown (ranked quarterly)
Panel B: By mfown quartile LO 2 3 HI
Mean, (Std dev), Median
firm size (millions) 3168 6686 4400 2821
(14938) (22869) (11802) (6487)
401 1079 1199 1044
illiq(avg) 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.04
(0.54) (0.22) (0.15) (0.14)
0.04 0.006 0.004 0.004
mfown 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.23
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
0.03 0.10 0.16 0.24
twmfown 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.19
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10)
0.02 0.07 0.11 0.17
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Table 4.2
Time Series Estimates of Liquidity Betas
This table reports summary statistics on liquidity betas with respect to a high mutual fund ownership portfolio and a market portfolio of NYSE
and AMEX stocks. Panel A reports these statistics for representative quarters in the sample. In each quarter and for each firm, the daily change
in the firm’s illiquidity (Amihud measure) is regressed on the daily changes in the illiquidity measure for a portfolio of high mutual fund ownership
stocks and a market portfolio as well as control variables.
∆illiqi,t = αi + βmfown ∗ ∆illiqmfown,t + βmkt ∗ ∆illiqmkt,t + controls













. In each time series regression the stock’s individual measure is removed from the market
portfolio and the high mfown portfolio (when applicable). The left columns summarize the coefficient estimates for the high mfown liquidity
portfolio, and the right columns summarize the market liquidity portfolio. In each quarter we record the average beta, the percent positive and
percent significant at the 5% level, and we compute a t-statistic on the sample of beta estimates in that quarter. Panel A reports averages for
representative quarters and Panel B reports averages over 5 year periods and the full sample.
Panel A: Representative quarters
HI mfown portfolio Market portfolio
R2 βHI %pos %sig tstat size mfown illiq(avg) #stocks βmkt %pos %sig tstat size mfown illiq(avg)
19802 0.30 0.22 54% 6% 3.39 543 0.09 0.083 301 0.20 56% 6% 3.86 878 0.04 0.126
19803 0.29 0.27 58% 6% 5.96 565 0.09 0.093 293 0.32 58% 8% 7.39 982 0.04 0.129
19804 0.30 0.57 67% 9% 11.97 637 0.09 0.084 275 0.15 54% 8% 3.19 1008 0.04 0.121
.
19951 0.29 0.31 62% 6% 6.50 2753 0.22 0.010 333 0.23 54% 8% 3.92 3973 0.13 0.038
19952 0.29 0.10 51% 6% 1.89 2865 0.23 0.010 333 0.37 59% 8% 7.14 4108 0.14 0.036
19953 0.29 0.42 58% 9% 7.08 2945 0.22 0.012 340 0.31 59% 8% 5.68 4236 0.14 0.040
19954 0.31 0.51 64% 9% 10.20 3096 0.23 0.012 364 0.30 59% 7% 6.47 4353 0.14 0.042
.
20081 0.32 0.29 60% 8% 8.02 3764 0.36 0.016 317 0.36 63% 12% 10.95 7869 0.22 0.091
20082 0.31 0.40 60% 10% 9.47 3060 0.36 0.010 309 0.38 62% 9% 9.55 7465 0.23 0.090
20083 0.31 0.19 55% 8% 5.20 1872 0.37 0.019 282 0.47 63% 13% 12.36 5807 0.24 0.138
Panel B: Five-year quarterly averages and full sample
1980-85 0.29 0.32 58% 7% 6.18 714 0.09 0.091 283 0.23 56% 7% 4.46 1201 0.05 0.120
1986-90 0.31 0.34 59% 8% 6.35 1670 0.11 0.046 254 0.22 57% 7% 4.46 2509 0.06 0.063
1991-95 0.30 0.30 58% 7% 5.44 2267 0.18 0.022 311 0.31 58% 8% 5.73 3487 0.11 0.045
1996-00 0.28 0.26 57% 6% 5.68 4953 0.26 0.018 410 0.24 56% 7% 5.55 5874 0.15 0.054
2001+ 0.29 0.33 60% 8% 8.91 4023 0.33 0.012 341 0.33 61% 9% 9.14 6831 0.20 0.074
1980-08 0.29 0.31 58% 7% 6.66 2813 0.20 0.036 321 0.27 58% 8% 6.17 4204 0.12 0.073
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Table 4.3
Liquidity Betas Sorted by Firm Characteristics
Panel A presents mutual fund and market liquidity betas sorted by firm characteristics. At the end of each quarter we sort stocks into quartiles
based on mfown, firm size, or illiq(avg). For each quartile we report the average βHI and βmkt measured over the subsequent quarter. Panel B
presents dependent sorts. First we sort on firm size or illiq(avg) each quarter, then within each bin we sort on mfown. All t-statistics are on the
difference in sample averages paired by quarter.
Average βHI Average βmkt
Panel A: One way sorts
mfown mfown
Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat
0.20 0.28 0.35 0.40 0.20 (12.22) 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.00 (-0.49)
firm size firm size
Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat
0.23 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.06 (3.47) 0.09 0.20 0.27 0.53 0.44 (24.45)
illiq(avg) illiq(avg)
Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat
0.31 0.37 0.34 0.21 -0.09 (-5.90) 0.51 0.29 0.19 0.10 -0.41 (-22.97)
Panel B: Dependent sorts - First on size or illiq(avg) then on mfown
mfown mfown
Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat
Small 0.18 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.09 (2.33) Small 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.03 (1.02)
firm size 2 0.22 0.27 0.36 0.42 0.20 (6.63) 2 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.18 -0.05 (-2.68)
3 0.27 0.33 0.41 0.45 0.18 (6.46) 3 0.28 0.32 0.24 0.26 -0.02 (-0.98)
Big 0.16 0.24 0.33 0.41 0.25 (9.48) Big 0.61 0.61 0.50 0.40 -0.21 (-6.79)
mfown mfown
Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat Lo 2 3 Hi Hi - Lo H-L tstat
Lo 0.14 0.24 0.33 0.43 0.29 (12.07) Lo 0.68 0.61 0.48 0.37 -0.31 (-9.78)
illiq(avg) 2 0.27 0.31 0.40 0.44 0.17 (5.92) 2 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.25 -0.10 (-4.30)
3 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.42 0.15 (4.91) 3 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17 -0.03 (-2.67)
Hi 0.17 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.07 (1.65) Hi 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.02 (0.85)
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Table 4.4
Relation Between Liquidity Commonality and Mutual Fund Ownership
This table reports results from the following Pooled OLS regression using alternate specifications:
βHI,i,t = a + b1 ∗ mfowni,t−1 + b2 ∗ ln(firmsizei,t−1) + b3 ∗ illiq(avg)i,t−1 + εi,t
where βHI is estimated as in equation (1). mfown and ln(firm size) are measured at the end of the previous quarter. illiq(avg)
is the firm’s average daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure over the previous quarter. Panel A uses the standard measure of
mfown and Panel B uses a dummy equal to 1 if mfown is in the top quartile in a given quarter, 0 otherwise. Quarter dummies
are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered by stock.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
mfown 0.896*** 0.838*** 0.457*** 0.557*** 1.009***
(14.73) (13.12) (4.58) (5.33) (9.23)
ln(firm size) -0.0021 0.0187** -0.0053 1.75e-05
(-0.56) (1.97) (-1.10) (0.00)
illiq(avg) -0.0890*** -0.0529** -0.1030*** -0.0954***
(-4.75) (-2.23) (-5.50) (-2.78)
Observations 120413 120413 120413 120413 120413
R2 0.012 0.012 0.055 0.002 0.002
Panel B
mfown (dummy) 0.127*** 0.120*** 0.0431*** 0.120*** 0.118***
(11.37) (10.69) (3.09) (9.06) (9.45)
ln(firm size) 0.0037 0.0231** 0.0036 0.0030
(0.97) (2.44) (0.73) (0.69)
illiq(avg) -0.106*** -0.0541** -0.102*** -0.117***
(-5.59) (-2.27) (-5.38) (-3.37)
Observations 120413 120413 120413 120413 120413
R2 0.011 0.011 0.055 0.002 0.002
Time effects Y Y Y
Firm effects Y
Time clusters Y




Relation Between Liquidity Commonality and Mutual Fund Ownership:
Subsample Analysis
This table reports results from the following Pooled OLS regression using various sub-samples based on size, average illiquidity,
and time:
βHI,i,t = a + b1 ∗ mfowni,t−1 + b2 ∗ ln(firmsizei,t−1) + b3 ∗ illiq(avg)i,t−1 + εi,t
where βHI is estimated as in equation (1). mfown and ln(firm size) are measured at the end of the previous quarter. illiq(avg)
is the firm’s average daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure over the previous quarter. Panels A and C report results of
regressions for size and illiquidity quartiles. Panels B and D report results of regressions for five year subperiods and for up
and down markets separately, where up(down) market periods are quarters in which the market return was positive(negative).
Panels A and B use the standard measure of mfown, and Panels C and D use a dummy equal to 1 if mfown is in the top quartile
in a given quarter, 0 otherwise. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered by stock.
size illiq(avg)
Panel A Lo 2 3 Hi Lo 2 3 Hi
mfown 0.155 0.738*** 0.761*** 1.008*** 1.016*** 0.668*** 0.659*** 0.151
(1.11) (6.81) (6.41) (6.90) (7.12) (5.31) (5.96) (1.04)
ln(firm size) 0.0513*** 0.0301 -0.0336 -0.0733*** -0.0800*** -0.0344* 0.0108 0.0192
(3.18) (0.99) (-1.20) (-5.40) (-6.44) (-1.90) (0.70) (1.54)
illiq(avg) -0.0334 -0.304 0.347 -1.032 -20.46*** -4.011* 1.038 -0.0402*
(-1.57) (-1.43) (1.21) (-0.88) (-2.89) (-1.76) (1.41) (-1.93)
Observations 30057 30120 30150 30086 30057 30120 30150 30086
R2 0.010 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.021 0.010
Panel B 1980-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 2001+ Down mkt Up mkt
mfown 1.095*** 1.487*** 1.187*** 0.349*** 1.006*** 0.950*** 0.785***
(3.49) (5.00) (7.61) (2.85) (12.64) (9.63) (10.43)
ln(firm size) 0.0161* -0.0007 0.0038 0.0004 -0.0049 0.0095* -0.0073*
(1.65) (-0.07) (0.62) (0.07) (-0.84) (1.69) (-1.70)
illiq(avg) -0.0763 -0.0662 -0.0991*** -0.0465 -0.0889*** -0.0674*** -0.101***
(-1.58) (-1.01) (-2.73) (-0.81) (-3.86) (-2.66) (-3.77)
Observations 21915 15885 51717 26587 38348 37325 83088
R2 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.018 0.016 0.011
size illiq(avg)
Panel C Lo 2 3 Hi Lo 2 3 Hi
mfown (dummy) 0.0108 0.109*** 0.0971*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.0889*** 0.0822*** 0.0154
(0.37) (5.40) (5.05) (6.20) (6.32) (4.64) (3.92) (0.48)
ln(firm size) 0.0551*** 0.0348 -0.0311 -0.0781*** -0.0881*** -0.0408** 0.0039 0.0199
(3.49) (1.14) (-1.10) (-5.72) (-7.06) (-2.28) (0.25) (1.59)
illiq(avg) -0.0345 -0.372* 0.184 -1.462 -22.71*** -4.495** 0.835 -0.0425**
(-1.63) (-1.75) (0.65) (-1.21) (-3.21) (-1.97) (1.13) (-2.06)
Observations 30057 30120 30150 30086 30057 30120 30150 30086
R2 0.010 0.023 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.009
Panel D 1980-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 2001+ Down mkt Up mkt
mfown (dummy) 0.0728*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.0770*** 0.166*** 0.140*** 0.111***
(2.79) (4.09) (6.72) (3.25) (9.39) (7.56) (8.38)
ln(firm size) 0.0159 -0.0020 0.0048 0.0020 0.0067 0.0163*** -0.0020
(1.62) (-0.20) (0.77) (0.30) (1.17) (2.90) (-0.45)
illiq(avg) -0.0844* -0.0808 -0.110*** -0.0551 -0.113*** -0.0852*** -0.116***
(-1.75) (-1.23) (-3.02) (-0.95) (-4.80) (-3.37) (-4.32)
Observations 21915 15885 51717 26587 38348 37325 83088
R2 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.010
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Table 4.6
Relation Between Liquidity Commonality and Turnover-weighted Mutual Fund
Ownership
This table reports results from a pooled OLS regression using a turnover weighted measure of mutual fund ownership. Specifically







where sharesownedj,i,t is the ownership of fund j in stock i at end of quarter t from CDA/Spectrum and turnoverj,t is the
turnover reported by CRSP for fund j over quarter t. Results are reported for the following regression using the subsample in
which the turnover variable is available quarterly from CRSP (1999+):
βHI,i,t = a + b1 ∗ twmfowni,t−1 + b2 ∗ mfowni,t−1 + b3 ∗ ln(firmsizei,t−1) + b4 ∗ illiq(avg)i,t−1 + εi,t.
Model (1) includes twmfown and for comparison model (2) includes the standard (unweighted) mfown over the same sample
for which turnover is available (1999+), and model (3) includes both variables. To facilitate comparison of coefficients, the last
three models repeat the first three but use standardized values of twmfown and mfown. Quarter dummies are included but not
reported. Standard errors are clustered by stock.
standardized variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
twmfown 1.331*** 1.152*** 0.112*** 0.0972***
(15.45) (8.31) (15.45) (8.31)
mfown 0.925*** 0.185 0.0935*** 0.0188
(12.65) (1.60) (12.65) (1.60)
ln(firm size) -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0035
(-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.72) (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.72)
illiq(avg) -0.0750*** -0.0787*** -0.0733*** -0.0750*** -0.0787*** -0.0733***
(-3.39) (-3.55) (-3.31) (-3.39) (-3.55) (-3.31)
Observations 48907 48907 48907 48907 48907 48907
R2 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021
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Table 4.7
Relation Between Liquidity Commonality and Mutual Fund Ownership
Conditional on Flows
This table reports results from a Pooled OLS regression of βHI on mfown conditional on fund flows. We define dummy
variables based on one of three measures of flows; aggregate net flows, aggregate inflows, or aggregate outflows in each quarter.
All aggregate flows are scaled by total US market capitalization. Flows are measured contemporaneously with βHI . The dummy
variable hiabsflow equals one if aggregate net flows are in either the highest 10% or lowest 10%, zero otherwise. negnetflow
equals one if aggregate net flows are negative (outflows) for that quarter and zero otherwise. We then define two dummy
variables using inflows and outflows aggregated separately in each quarter. hiinflow equals one for the top 25% of quarters of
inflows scaled by market cap, and hioutflow equals one for the top 25% of quarters of outflows scaled by market cap. Models
(1)-(4) use the full sample. Models (5)-(8) show the effect of mfown within subsamples defined by aggregate net flows. Quarter
dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered by stock.
In Panel B we first run 115 cross sectional regressions of βHI on mfown and control for size and liquidity. Then we regress the
time series of mfown coefficients on aggregate flows and the square of aggregate flows in order to test for a U-shaped relationship.
Full sample Subsamples:Agg flows as % of US mkt cap
Panel A < 0% 0 to 0.5% 0.5 to 1% > 1%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mfown 0.765*** 0.762*** 1.174*** 0.852*** 0.710*** 0.935***
(11.13) (11.33) (7.97) (7.04) (8.01) (7.14)
hiabsflow * mfown 0.395***
(3.12)
negnetflow * mfown 0.575***
(3.91)
ln(firm size) -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0083 -0.0023 0.0037
(-0.50) (-0.47) (-0.062) (-1.23) (-0.47) (0.52)
illiq(avg) -0.0880*** -0.0880*** -0.106** -0.135*** -0.0960*** -0.0157
(-4.70) (-4.70) (-2.14) (-3.62) (-3.53) (-0.54)
Observations 120413 120413 16873 23900 53604 26036
R2 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.008
Panel B











Relation Between Liquidity Commonality and Changes in Mutual Fund
Ownership
This table reports results of a Pooled OLS regression of βHI at time t on the absolute value of the change in mfown from t− 1
to t, lagged firm size and lagged average illiquidity:
βHI,i,t = a + b1 ∗ |∆t−1,tmfowni| + b2 ∗ ln(firmsizei,t−1) + b3 ∗ illiq(avg)i,t−1 + εi,t.
In model (2) we replace the absolute change in mutual fund ownership with a dummy variable set to one if the absolute change














Robustness Tests: Controlling for Return and Volatility Covariation
This table reports results from Pooled OLS regressions of βHI on mfown with additional controls. Panel A reports results
controlling for commonality in returns and Panel B reports results controlling for commonality in volatility. The first model
repeats the standard regression of βHI on mutual fund ownership (as in models (1) and (2) of Table 4.4) and includes as a
control variable the beta estimate between the firm return and the value-weighted return on the high mutual fund ownership
portfolio estimated contemporaneously with the liquidity beta. Models (2)-(5) run the standard regression on cross-sectional
subsamples sorted by the return beta. Model (6) runs the standard regression, but controls for return covariation in the first
stage. Specifically, the dependent variable is a liquidity beta estimated in a time series regression that controls for firm returns
and the return on the high mutual fund ownership portfolio. We repeat this analysis in Panel B, substituting returns-squared
for returns, as a proxy for volatility.
Panel A: Controlling for covariation in returns
mutual fund return beta subsamples 1st stage control
full Lo 2 3 Hi for returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mfown 0.706*** 0.619*** 0.716*** 0.516*** 0.620*** 0.806***
(11.25) (5.34) (5.89) (4.45) (5.44) (12.08)
ln(firm size) 0.0009 -0.0260*** -0.0126* 0.0174** 0.0468*** 0.00125
(0.25) (-4.67) (-1.91) (2.54) (6.73) (0.32)
illiq(avg) -0.0807*** -0.0641*** -0.121*** -0.0950 -0.0709** -0.0707***
(-4.33) (-2.64) (-3.06) (-1.63) (-2.09) (-3.33)
mutual fund 0.051***
return beta (17.42)
Observations 120413 30057 30120 30150 30086 120413
R2 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.021 0.011
Panel B: Controlling for covariation in returns-squared
mutual fund return2 beta subsamples 1st stage control
full Lo 2 3 Hi for ret squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mfown 0.830*** 0.673*** 0.839*** 0.638*** 0.671*** 0.800***
(13.01) (6.16) (7.07) (5.32) (5.64) (11.93)
ln(firm size) -0.0020 -0.0145** -0.0230*** 0.0117* 0.0352*** 0.00174
(-0.52) (-2.32) (-3.48) (1.87) (5.22) (0.44)
illiq(avg) -0.0876*** -0.0663*** -0.139** -0.157*** -0.0627* -0.0948***
(-4.69) (-2.72) (-2.27) (-3.95) (-1.88) (-4.56)
mutual fund 0.0022***
phantomasreturn2 beta (4.84)
Observations 120413 30057 30120 30150 30086 120413
R2 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.012
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Table 4.10
Robustness Tests: Alternate Measures of Liquidity Betas
This table reports the results of Pooled OLS regressions of βHI on mutual fund ownership (as in the first two models of Table 4.4) using alternate
measures of liquidity betas. In model (1) the dependent variable is the liquidity beta estimate on an equal-weighted portfolio of high mfown stocks
instead of a value-weighted portfolio. In model (2) the dependent variable is a sum beta that equals βHI plus the betas on lead and lag values of
the high mfown portfolio (measured in the standard way). In model (3) we use βHI on the typical high mfown portfolio, but we also control for
liquidity covariation with stocks in the same industry (lead, lag, and contemporaneous changes in the industry portfolio as identified by two-digit
SIC code). Model (4) uses βHI from a similar time series regression as in model (3), but we also include contemporaneous, lead and lag returns on
the high mfown portfolio as well as those on the industry portfolio. Models (5) and (6) use only one portfolio in the time series beta estimation,
the market portfolio and the high mfown portfolio respectively. Model (7) reports results using changes in liquidity from a five day moving average
(as opposed to a first difference). Specifically we compute the change in illiquidity as the log of the ratio of Amihud’s illiquidity measure at day t
to the average of this measure of the previous five trading days. Model (8) uses turnover instead of Amihud’s illiquidity measure. The last model
uses the beta on a portfolio of randomly selected stocks. Specifically we choose 25% of the stocks in each quarter and compute a value-weighted
change in daily liquidity for this random portfolio. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions and standard errors are clustered by stock.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
turnover equal sum industry ind and ret βmkt βHI quasi- random
weight betas controls controls only only differencing MO port
mfown 1.830*** 2.063*** 0.810*** 0.761*** 0.760*** 0.314*** 0.504*** 0.721*** 0.0611
(18.96) (15.19) (6.87) (11.67) (9.49) (7.79) (12.41) (12.58) (1.46)
ln(firm size) -0.0712*** 0.0491*** -0.0176*** -0.0057 -0.0003 0.114*** 0.101*** -0.0046 0.0027
(-12.10) (6.51) (-2.73) (-1.52) (-0.07) (43.78) (40.11) (-1.45) (1.20)
illiq(avg) -0.128*** -0.0903** -0.0694* -0.0790*** 0.0090 -0.0039 -0.0277*** -0.0778*** 0.0079
(-2.71) (-2.35) (-1.95) (-3.92) (0.12) (-0.39) (-2.58) (-3.93) (0.52)
Observations 120413 120413 120413 120114 120114 120413 120413 120413 120413
R2 0.017 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.075 0.066 0.014 0.012
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